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RANDOM NUMBERS, CHAOS THEORY, AND COGITATION:

A SEARCH FOR THE MINIMAL CREATIVITY STANDARD IN
COPYRIGHT LAW

RALPH D. CLIFFORD
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INTRODUCTION

The copyright axiom that creativity 2 is required for copyright validity is oft-times expressed, but has not been of great historic significance.
As a professor from the 1970s could have said, "Copyright requires creativity-it requires that the author create the work by the author's own
' 3
labor. Nothing more is required than not copying someone else's work.
Today, however, the copyright creativity standard is no longer as simple
as two complicating factors are evolving.4 From one side are questions
raised by new technology that can exercise, or at least simulate, creativity using artificial intelligence techniques negating the need for human
involvement in the work's creation. 5 For these works, although the
resulting work might be highly "creative," no human creative or
expressive acts were needed, thus raising the issue of whether a copyright subsists in the generated expression. 6 From the other side are questions raised by qualitatively insignificant, or at least legally insufficient,
human labors involved in the work's generation. In some cases, the invention of a new technology might have made the creation of a work
mechanical where formerly significant human creativity and labor would
have been required.7
2. As will become clear, a simple, appropriate definition of the word creativity does not
exist. See infra Section l1l.
3. See, e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN, JR., CASES ON COPYRIGHT 57-104 (3d
ed. 1978). See also Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and the Legislative
History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 549, 585 (1995) (discussing how the Supreme Court imposed a creativity standard that was not present in the 1976 Copyright Act).
4. The trends being discussed in this article were firmly recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). Before
Feist, several circuits recognized the "sweat of the brow" theory of creativity for the purposes of a
copyright. Jewelers' Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922); Leon
v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). This theory maintained that as long as the
author worked hard to produce the work, it contained sufficient creativity to be copyrighted. See
Jewelers' Circular,281 F. at 88; Leon, 91 F.2d at 486. Feistexpressly rejected this theory and held,
as a matter of constitutional law, that more creativity than that was required before a copyright
would subsist. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352.
5. See generally Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True CreatorPlease Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675 (1997) [hereinafter
Clifford, Creative Computer Program](discussing the copyrightability of expressive works created
using artificial intelligence techniques). Development of the computer techniques discussed in this
1997 article has continued apace. See John R. Koza, Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Streeter, Evolving Inventions, Sci. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52 (commenting that "computer programs that function via
Darwinian evolution are creating inventions that are novel and useful enough to be patented."). Cf
Lance Ulanoff, Cognitive Machines, P.C. MAG., July 2003, at 118 (describing progress in robotics
and self-aware machines).
6. See Clifford, Creative Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1695. Indeed, with a truly
creative computer program, the human cannot even claim to have originated the work. In many
ways, this serves to distinguish the topic of Clifford, Creative Computer Program,from the subject
of this paper. With a creative computer program, the human is not the author of the work, making
the issue of the quantum of creativity needed superfluous. In this paper, the concern is not with a
creative computer program that appears to be the author of a work; instead, the article will address
how to measure the characteristics of the work that the human created in order to establish whether
federal copyright protection is available.
7. See, e.g., Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 1-6
(S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998) (discussing computer generated bingo cards), affd, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th
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Consequently, although the resulting work might have once been
recognized as "creative," modem technology has made it seem unimaginative and potentially without a subsisting copyright. In other cases, the
work itself may have been produced without the expenditure of sufficient
creative effort even though significant physical labor may have been
exerted. 8 A copyright in these works no longer exists as they lack "creativity," as that copyright requirement was reinterpreted in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.9

This article explores the second type of expressive work, those
where there is a question if the author's contribution is qualitatively sufficient, to determine how much creativity and of what type is required to
sustain a copyright. 0 Initially, the historic standards of creativity used
before Feist was decided in 1991 will be presented. Then, after a brief
Cir. 1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831). Very typically, as was the case in Stuart, the generation of the work depends on a random number generator. A "random number generator" is a
computer program that can be used to generate a series of pseudorandom numbers. WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERsS 480 (5th ed. 1994).
These numbers are pseudorandom because it is generally impossible to establish that they
are "completely unpredictable" as would be the case for a true random number. Shawn Carlson,
Falling into Chaos, SC1. AM., Nov. 1999, at 120, 121. Further, the sequence of computer-generated
random numbers will repeat given a sufficiently long period of time. See George Marsaglia, Random
Number Generation in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1499 (Anthony Ralston et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2000) (describing random number generator algorithms and the difficulties in establishing
that they produce sufficiently random numbers).
8. These are the classic "sweat of the brow" cases where some circuits would have recognized a copyright. See Leon, 91 F.2d at 486; Jeweler's Circular,281 F. at 88. See also, Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1569 (1963); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990). The Supreme Court has now rejected the sweat of the
brow theory. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60 (finding white pages of a telephone book not protected by
copyright as they lack sufficient creativity).
Of course, historically, the quantity of human work necessary to produce the type of
alphabetized directory involved in Feist was very significant as it is extremely difficult for humans
to alphabetize a large list of names. It has only been the invention of the computer that makes the
creation of an ordered list seem insignificant and mundane. See generally, 3 DONALD E. KNUTH,
THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING (1973) (discussing the algorithmic complexity of placing
information into order). See infra Section Ml.A, discussing the consequences of increasing computerization on the copyrightability of works.
9. Compare Feist, 499 U.S. at 364 (disallowing a copyright in a directory) with Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("The least pretentious picture has more
originality in it than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted.") (emphasis added) (dictum). See also CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Canada, [20021 F.C. 187, 9I[ 44-48,
available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca187.html (describing the extra creativity
requirement under United States law and indicating that it is a departure from the English roots of
copyright law) (last visited Feb. 3, 2005), rev'd on other grounds, [2004] S.C.R. 339, available at
(last visited
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2004/voll/html/2004scrl_0339.html
Feb. 3, 2005).
Feist, itself, involved the copyrightability of the white pages in a telephone book. Feist,
499 U.S. at 342. Rural, the regulated telephone utility in the area, had produced its directory because
it was required to do so by law. Id. Feist had directly copied the list of names and phone numbers
contained in Rural's telephone book in order to produce its own, competing telephone book. Id. at
343. Both the district court and the court of appeals held the copyright valid and awarded judgment
to Rural. Id. at 344. The Supreme Court reversed on the issue of copyrightability. Id. at 364.
10. The author's analysis of the first type of work can be found in Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5.
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discussion of Feist, the scientific basis of creativity will be explored.
Next, the confusion regarding creativity that exists in the lower courts
will serve to expose the source of misapplication of the law-a disconnect between how courts perceive creativity and its physiological origins.
Finally, a new analytical approach of evaluating the presence of creativity will be suggested to refocus the Feistjurisprudence on its purpose and
to make it consistent with the reality of thought and ingenuity in the human brain.
I.

A.

THE HISTORIC COPYRIGHT CREATIVITY STANDARD

The Burrow-Giles Decision

The earliest important Supreme Court case to consider the question
of the needed creativity in a copyrighted work was Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. 11 In the case, Sarony alleged that the defendant
had infringed his copyright in a photograph he had produced of Oscar
Wilde by printing 85,000 lithographic copies.1 2 In response to the defendant's claim that photographs could not be copyrighted, the Court concluded that they were a writing of an author by holding:
An author in that sense is he to whom anything owes its origin; origi-

nator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature. So,
also, no one would now claim that the word "writing" in this clause
of the constitution, though the only word used as to subjects in regard
to which authors are to be secured, is limited to the actual script of
the author, and excludes books and all other printed matter. By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of those authors,
and congress very properly has declared these to include all forms of
writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by 13
which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression.
Contained within this early consideration of the nature of a copyrightable work are two key concepts. First, an author can be identified by
determining who was responsible for expressing the work in a physical
11.
111 U.S. 53 (1884). Although Burrow-Giles was the first case to consider copyright
creativity in depth, the Supreme Court had addressed the issue briefly five years earlier in The
Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). In those consolidated cases, the Court was requested to rule
on the constitutionality of the first trademark statute adopted by the Congress. See id. at 91-92. One
possible congressional power that had been exercised to adopt the statute was the Intellectual Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See id. at 93. [hereinafter I.P. Clause]. Concluding that
trademark legislation could not be sustained under the I.P. Clause, the Court held that "it is only
[writing] as are original,and are founded in the creative powers of the mind" that can be protected.
Id. at 94. The Court did not conclude that a trademark necessarily would not qualify under this
standard; instead, the Court pointed out that Congress had not required trademarks to be original in
order to qualify for a trademark. See id. Consequently, although indicating that there was a creativity standard associated with the I.P. Clause, the Court did little to explain it. A detailed consideration
of the case, therefore, does little to enhance an understanding of the copyright creativity standard.
12.
See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54.
13.
Id. at 57-58 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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form. 14 This aspect of copyright creativity will be termed "origin creativity." Second, an author can be identified as the individual who had at
least one idea that is expressed in the perceivable work.'" This process of
having a conception and reducing it to an articulation will be called "intellectual creativity."
This early standard of creativity expressed by the Court justifies the
conclusion that copyright law was far more concerned with origin creativity than with intellectual creativity. Although there must have been an
idea in the mind of the author, once this had been determined, no concern
was expressed about the mechanisms chosen by the author to reduce that
idea to expression. Additionally, once this idea is found, the Court
seemed unconcerned with the underlying ingenuity or complexity of the
idea. Consequently, the quantity of intellectual creativity needed, although existing, was clearly de minimis. If Burrow-Giles is applied to
the facts in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.16 for

example, one would conclude that the Feist directory was copyrightable.
First, all parties admitted that the white pages had been created by the
plaintiff, so the requirement of origin creativity is satisfied. 7 Similarly,
there was an idea in the minds of the corporate agents of the plaintiff,
producing an alphabetical directory of subscribers, which had been reduced to a physical expression.'" Therefore, these would satisfy the
minimal standards required by origin and intellectual creativity as defined by the Burrow-GilesCourt.
B.

The Bleistein Decision
The next important case for understanding the copyright creativity

standard, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., t 9 was decided in
14. See id. at 58 ("[Clongress very properly has declared [copyrightable writings] to include
all forms of writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression.").
15.
See id. ("[writings... include all forms of [expression] by which the ideas in the mind of
the author are given visible expression.").

16. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
17. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.
18. See id. at 363.
19.
188 U.S. 239 (1903). Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879) (denying a copyright to the
forms associated with a system of accounting) also could be considered to have addressed the
amount of creativity needed for a copyright. Certainly, that is how the Second Circuit used the case
in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). More accurately,

however, Baker should be seen as the Supreme Court's establishment of the idea-expression dichotomy and of the lack of copyrightability that results when the idea and the expression merge. The
Court stated:
There is no doubt that a work on the subject of book-keeping, though only explanatory of
well-known systems, may be the subject of a copyright; but, then, it is claimed only as a
book. Such a book may be explanatory either of old systems, or of an entirely new system; and, considered as a book, as the work of an author, conveying information on the

subject of book-keeping, and containing detailed explanations of the art, it may be a very
valuable acquisition to the practical knowledge of the community. But there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate. The mere
statement of the proposition is so evident, that it requires hardly any argument to support
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1903. In Bleistein, the Court again focused on the importance of origin
creativity and minimized the amount of intellectual creativity needed to
justify a copyright:
Others are free to copy the [source of a copyrighted picture]. They
are not free to copy the copy. The copy is the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man's alone. That something he20 may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.

The Court assumed that if a work has been produced by someone,
2
some aspect of that individual's personality would be reflected in it. 1
This minimal reflection of personality sufficiently evidences the intellectual creativity to support a copyright; indeed, the Court noted that even
the individual handwriting of the author would be enough.22 The Court
indicated that only a "modest grade of art' 23 was needed to satisfy the
intellectual creativity requirement of the Copyright Act with the mentioned examples indicating the extreme paltriness of the requisite.
Additionally, the Court was obviously concerned that allowing a
court or jury to evaluate the quantity or quality of intellectual creativity
contained in a work could defeat the primary purpose of the Copyright
Act to increase the amount of expression created.24 An evaluation of intellectual creativity could easily lead to a copyright system that encourages only expressions that appeal to those in the legal system. 25 In other
it. The same distinction may be predicated of every other art as well as that of bookkeeping. A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the
construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or chums; or on the mixture and application
of colors for painting or dyeing: or on the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect of
perspective, would be the subject of copyright; but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described
therein.
Baker, 101 U.S. at 101-02. Subsequently, triggering the development of the idea-expression merger
doctrine, the Court continued, "[the accounting system] is open and free to the use of the public.
And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as
incident to it." Id. at 104.
Now, the idea-expression dichotomy with its resulting merger doctrine have been codified. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal
system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.").
See generally Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality Standard
of Copyright, 33 ARtZ. ST. L.J. 791, 797-801 (2001) (discussing idea-expression dichotomy).
20. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
21.
ld. at 250.
22.
See id. ("[An author's work] expresses its singularity even in handwriting ....
23.
Id.
24. Id.
25.
See id. at 251-52.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
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words, the risk that the Court seemed to be avoiding was that allowing an
evaluation of the plenitude of intellectual creativity rather than only its
presence could too easily turn into an exercise in commercial or judicial
censorship.26
Consequently, the Court stressed that origin creativity was almost
sufficient in its own right to justify a copyright. Indeed, another's desire
to copy the work seemed to provide all of the evidence that intellectual
creativity was contained within the work, consequently sustaining its
copyright.2 7 Anything beyond origin creativity and extremely minimal
intellectual creativity was relegated to a role in determining the scope of
the copyright, not its validity.28
The lower courts appreciated the limited requirement of creativity
associated with a copyright:
Original in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular
work owes its origin to the author. No large measure of novelty is
necessary ....All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and
the statute is that the author contributed something more than a
merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own. Originality
in this context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.
No matter how
poor artistically the author's addition, it is enough if it
29
be his own.

So indeed, it is fair to conclude that the creativity requirement of the
Intellectual Property Clause 30 was perceived to require practically nothmost obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the
new language in which their author spoke ....At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value, it would be bold to
say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value, - and the taste of any public is
not to be treated with contempt.
Id.
The Court's concern is well founded. It is difficult to see how intellectual creativity can be
evaluated except in the context of the field the work addresses. See MIHALY CS1KSZENTMIHALYI,
CREATIVITY 27-29 (1996).
26. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252 ("That these pictures had their worth and their success is
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs' rights. We are of
opinion that there was evidence that the plaintiffs have rights entitled to the protection of the law.")
(citation omitted).
27. Compare id. (majority opinion) with id. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
No evidence, aside from the deductions which are to be drawn from the prints themselves, was offered to show that these designs had any original artistic qualities. The jury
could not reasonably have found merit or value aside from the purely business object of
advertising a show, and the instruction to find for the defendant was not error.
Id.
28. See id. at 251 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The limited intellectual creativity] may be a
circumstance for the jury to consider in determining the extent of Mr. Wallace's rights, but it is not a
bar.").
29. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03 (quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
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ing in addition to origin creativity. Any variation that goes just beyond
the trivial was deemed sufficient to satisfy intellectual creativity.
I.

A.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STANDARD

Early Warning Signs

An early suggestion that the traditional, minimalist intellectual creativity requirement was no longer being blindly accepted by all of the
Justices occurred in Justice Douglas's dissent to the denial of certiorari in
Lee v. Runge31 in 1971. Justice Douglas examined the Intellectual Prop-

erty Clause of the Constitution 32 and expostulated that the requisite creativity required for a copyright should be at least as high as that required
for a patent.33 "No reason can be offered why we should depart from the
plain import of this grant of congressional power and apply more lenient
34
constitutional standards to copyrights than to patents." Indeed, Justice

Douglas's dissent suggested that the standard for copyright creativity
should be higher than that required of a patent,35 particularly when the
conflict he perceived between the copyright power and the First
Amendment was considered.36

Although this desire to reexamine the standard of copyrightability
appears to occur suddenly without any prior substantial judicial activity
in the area, its timing can be appreciated as reflecting the changes occurring in the societal importance of copyright at the time the Lee case was
presented to the Court in the early 1970s. 37 The original minimalist intel404 U.S. 887 (1971) (denying cert.) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31.
8.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
Lee, 404 U.S. at 889-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33.
34. Id. at 890 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Justice Douglas explained his understanding of the patent standards as follows:
35.
Patents which did not serve the broad goals of furthering scientific advancement and bettering the lot of mankind have been held invalid because they lacked utility, did no more
than combine existing inventions, were obvious to someone schooled in the art, or sought
to monopolize ideas within the public domain. It is not obvious that respondent's system
of facial exercises was patentable under these standards. It arguably amounted to nothing
more than an application of existing knowledge based upon sources available to all men.
We have repeatedly held that patents so devoid of novelty were invalid. To create a monopoly under the copyright power which would not be available under the patent power
would be to betray the common birthright of all men at the altar of hollow fomalisms.
Id. at 891 (Douglas, ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
36. See id. at 893 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The arena of public debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright his
speeches or a philosopher his treatises and thus obtain a monopoly on the ideas they contained. We should not construe the copyright laws to conflict so patently with the values
that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
Id.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright:A Study of Copyright in Books,
37.
Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970) (discussing a change in copyright materials, such as computer programs, and the change in copyrighted material reproduction
technology, such as copiers). Indeed, the Supreme Court would find itself deeply involved in the
debate over the proper intellectual property treatment of computer technology throughout the 1970s.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972); Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978).
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lectual creativity standard had developed when the primary work protected by copyright was a book or other expression created by placing
ink on a paper substrate. This technology made reproduction of the work
difficult. During this era, while it might be expensive, or at least labor
intensive, to create a copyrighted work, it was far more expensive to reproduce the work itself.3s By the 1970s, however, duplication costs had
started to decrease dramatically, first because of the photocopier but,
ultimately, and far more significantly, because of the computer.39 Consequently, where earlier the intellectual creativity expressed within a work
could be considered of comparatively minor import as it contributed less
significantly to the expense of generating the work than the difficulties of
reproduction did, by the time the Lee case was decided, the costs of reproduction were declining, 40 and would continue to decrease precipitously, 4' thus increasing the economic import of the intellectual creativity
in the work.
Further, without belittling the importance these earlier works had to
the development of society and intellection, they were not as pivotal to
the economy as many copyrighted expressions are today. It is hard to
imagine, now, how our society would be able to operate without the use
of massive computer systems, the software for which is within the ambit
of copyright. 42 For both of these reasons, the requirement of greater intellectual creativity for copyright, foreseen by Justice Douglas in Lee, ultimately became doctrine in Feist.

38. See Breyer, supra note 37, at 295 (approximately 85% of a publisher's costs of producing
a book come from non-royalty associated expenses).
39. Cf A.J. Meadows, Economic and Social Factors, in THE FUTURE OF THE PRINTED WORD
149, 151 (Philip Hills ed., 1980) (number of lines of type that could be set was fairly constant
through about 1950, but has "shot up" since then); Shirley Homer, About Books, N.Y. TIMES, July

23, 1989, § 12NJ, at 19.
40.
Photocopying was a significantly less expensive method of reproduction than typesetting.
The labor required by photocopying was comparatively insignificant in quantity and, as importantly,
could be performed by comparatively unskilled individuals. Once computer technology started
being used to reproduce copyrighted works, much of the cost of typesetting disappeared. See generally OLDRICH STANDERA, THE ELECTRONIC ERA OF PUBLISHING 235-37 (Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 1987) (describing the increasing role of and decreasing costs from computer technology).
41.
Once digitized, the cost of reproduction, often with the same quality as the original, becomes not much more than the cost of the medium upon which the work is recorded. Today, with the
Internet, the cost of the medium is, effectively, zero. See The Internet Society-A Fine Balance, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 2003, 2003 WL 6244750, at http://www.economist.comlopinion/
displayStory.cfmstory-id=1534271(last visited Feb. 5, 2005). Consequently, where formerly the
costs of reproduction were the most significant component of distributing a copyrighted work to the
public, today, the cost of intellectual creation transcends other expenses.

42.

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining computer program). See also RAYMOND T.

NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1:1 (3d ed. 2003) ("Since the 1980s, copyright
law has been a major form of protection and property rights for computer programs, databases,
software technology ... ").
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The Feist Decision

43
In Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. decided
45
4
in 1991, an effectively unanimous Supreme Court altered the amount
of intellectual creativity that must be found for a work to be copyrightable by determining that the white pages of a telephone book did not
qualify. 46 The Court stated:

To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the
author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no
matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be. Originality does
not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the re47
sult of copying.
The necessary quantum of intellectual creativity under Feist seems
significantly different than the Court's earlier elaboration of the standard
48
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. While all Bleistein required was that the work contain enough creative expression that someone else desired to copy it,4 9 now the work must "possess some creative
the Court provided no clear guidance on what a
spark. 50 Unfortunately,
"creative spark" is.5 ' How, then, are we to evaluate the quantity of intel43. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
44. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but did not write an opinion to explain why
he did not join the opinion of the Court signed by the other eight Justices. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 341.
45. See supra note 9.
46. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
47. Id. at 345 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
48.
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
See id. at 345-46. Professor Woodmansee argues the notion of a "creative spark" underly51.
ing a copyrighted expression is a "romantic" concept owing its origin to European culture of the
nineteenth century. Martha Woodmansee, Response to David Nimmer, 38 HoUS. L. REV. 231, 231
(2001). She argues:
The conclusion that my discipline has reached over the past thirty years is that the
distinction ["between 'sweat of the brow' and truly creative 'authorial' works"] is specious-that it is arbitrary and frequently a source of serious harm. Empirical research into
the nature of composition, and creative production generally, has shown that we are always already cutting and pasting; and historical research has shown that the inclination to
represent some creative productions as somehow more truly creative is rather recent. Not
until the end of the eighteenth century do we find poets, publishers, and parliamentarians
insisting on the originality of (some) creative work. The impetus for this Romantic
(mis)representation of creative activity was the expansion-the first big expansion-in
the market for printed books. In an effort to achieve visibility in a growing sea of printed
matter, creative producers began to insist on the originality of their work: "My work is
innovative; yours is merely hackwork."
Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted).
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lectual creativity contained within a work; indeed, how are we to recognize intellectual creativity when we see it?
Unfortunately, upon dissection, the Feist decision fails to answer
this basic question; indeed, the Court provides contradictory statements
about the nature of the creativity needed. The Court's description of the
intellectual creativity requisite indicated expressly that novelty was not
required. 52 Two works, identical by happenstance, were each to remain
copyrightable. Further, as long as there was at least a "crude, humble or
obvious" element of creativity within the work, a copyright would subsist. 53 The problem with this expression as guidance on the standard of
minimal copyright creativity is that the work before the Court in Feist,in
fact, had a humble and obvious element of creativity in it, at least under
the law as it was understood before Feist. The idea of listing customers
in alphabetic order, although not characterizable as brilliant, is touched
with some creativity of the most obvious kind. "Obvious," after all,
means something that is "easily seen, recognized, or understood; open to
view or knowledge; evident [or] lacking in subtlety. 5 4 Listing names in
alphabetical order unequivocally satisfies this definition. Consequently,
the Court must have meant something more than its stated "crude, humble or obvious" element analysis would suggest.
The confusion between the Court's expression of a new copyright
intellectual creativity standard and the application of it becomes even
more apparent later in the opinion. The Court indicated that the white
pages in question were uncopyrightable as they were "entirely typical. 55
Because being typical suggests lacking novelty,5 6 the Court therefore
implicitly rejected the copyright in the white pages because of its lack of
novelty.57 This conclusion directly contradicts the Court's earlier statements that expressly indicated that novelty was not required.58 This, then,

Those that see creativity as the Supreme Court did in Feisthave been termed "inspirationalists." Ben Shneiderman, Creating 7: User Interfaces for Supporting Innovation, 7 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUMAN INTERAcTION 114, 116 (Mar. 2000). Inspirationalists view
creativity as "a dramatic breakthrough [that] magically appears." Id. The Court seems to have a

history of seeing creativity as an inspirationalist. See Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (invention must be based on a "flash of creative genius").
52. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. "Novel" is defined as "of a new kind; different from anything
seen or known before." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1327 (2d ed. 1993).
53.
54.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1339 (2d ed. 1993).

55. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
56. Compare RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2046 (2d ed. 1993) ("Typical" is
defined as: "of the nature of or serving as a type or representative specimen") with id. at 1327
("Novel" is defined as: "of a new kind; different from anything seen or known before").
57. See Feist,499 U.S. at 362.
58.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The Court continued in this vein when it stated,

"[T]here is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course." Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. In other words, the white pages lack creativity because everyone else does it that way.
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raises the core question: What is "creativity" and how can the courts recognize it?
111.

WHAT IS CREATIVITY, ANYWAY?

As the Court has transformed the understanding of the term "creativity" in copyright law, using the term in such phrases as "creative
spark" 59 indicating that more than origin creativity is needed, an under6°
standing of human-based artistic or intellectual creativity becomes
mandatory. There is no singular definition of this type of creativity, however. 6 Therefore, before undertaking an analysis of the copyright requisite, it is necessary to examine the various meanings of creativity to determine what subset of them constitute the relevant group for copyright
law. As the Court's reference to creativity seems to demand a determination that there is sufficient human-based creativity associated with the
work,62 the two disciplines that are most apropos for deriving the Court's
As a practical matter, it is hard to imagine what the intellectual creativity requirement can
mean if novelty is not a significant factor to be examined in the analysis. See Robert J. Sternberg,
The Creativity Paradox: Why Everyone and No One Seems to Appreciate Creative Work, 30 APA
MONITOR ONLINE, Nov. 1999, at http://www.apa.org/monitor/nov99/scispeak.html ("A creative idea
is one that is novel and good.") (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
59. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
60. See 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 544 (1993) ("Having the quality
of creating; able to create; of or pertaining to creation, spec. inventive, imaginative, showing imagination as well as routine skill; intended to stimulate the imagination.").
See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI supra note 25, at 25 ("The problem is that the term 'creativity' as
61.
commonly used covers too much ground. It refers to very different entities, thus causing a great deal
of confusion."). See also DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, GENIUS AND CREATIVITY: SELECTED PAPERS 263
(1997) (discussing why some works are considered "more famous" than others); DAVID JONES,
CREATIVITY 1 (1984) ("There is little agreement amongst researchers about the nature of creativity;
the topic is approached from a wide range of differing psychological and philosophical perspectives.
There is not even agreement about how creativity can be identified"); JAMES FREEMAN ET AL.,
CREATIVITY-A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF RESEARCH 2 (2d ed. 1971) ("Current views on the nature of
creativity differ widely and cannot easily be separated from views on intelligence and intelligence
testing, the assessment of special aptitudes and abilities, learning theory, personality theory, and the
psychology of thinking.").
Even a dictionary lists multiple definitions that express different aspects of creativity.
Compare RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1993) (defining "creative" and
"creativity" as including the "state" of being creative, the ability to be creative, and the results of
having been creative), with 1THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 544 (1993) (defining "creative" as "1. Having the quality of creating; able to create; of or pertaining to creation, spec.
inventive, imaginative, showing imagination as well as routine skill; intended to stimulate the imagination. 2. Productive.").
Professor Shneiderman divides the description of creativity into three camps of scholars.
The first are the "inspirationalists" who see creativity as occurring dramatically and suddenly. See
Shneiderman supranote 51, at 116. Second are the "structuralists" who describe creativity as a more
iterative approach where the current body of thought is restructured into a new work. See id. at 11617. The final group are the "situationalists" who approach creativity as socially triggered and being
ultimately the result of a value judgment made by the idea's originator's peers. See id. at 117.
62. At this stage of the argument, it is necessary to assume that human creativity exists.
Whether this is true is subject to some scientific and philosophic debate. See DOUGLAS R.
HOFSTADTER & DANIEL C. DENNE'rr, THE MIND'S I 283"(Bantam ed. 1982).
Not only does our conscious minds activity create permanent side effects at the neural
level; the inverse holds too: Our conscious thoughts seem to come bubbling up from subterranean caverns of our mind, images flood into our minds eye without our having any
idea where they came from! Yet when we publish them, we expect that we-not our sub-
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meaning are human psychology and neurobiology,6 3 although some of
the work of computer scientists working with artificial intelligence adds
to the understanding. 64 Both primary fields have actively studied creativity, attempting to establish its scientific basis.
Indeed, the recent study of creativity by psychologists provides
highly compelling analytical tools with which to begin a cogent analysis
of copyright creativity. Researchers have split the consideration of creativity into four separate studies: "(1) the creative process, (2) the creative
product, (3) the creative person, and (4) the creative situation.",6' In addressing copyrights and whether sufficient intellectual creativity is con66
tained within the work, the primary focus should be on the product,
67
although the process used to produce the work is also relevant.' The
other two aspects of creativity are not relevant, as copyright law should
not care about how creative the individual who created the work was in
general as long as the copyrighted work was touched with sufficient intellectual creativity. After all, brilliant works have been produced by

conscious structures-will get credit for our thoughts. This dichotomy of the creative self
into a conscious part and an unconscious part is one of the most disturbing aspects of trying to understand the mind. If-as was just asserted-our best ideas come burbling up as
if from mysterious underground springs, then who really are we? Where does the creative
spirit really reside? Is it by an act of will that we create, or are we just automata made out
of biological hardware, from birth until death fooling ourselves through idle chatter into
thinking that we have 'free will'? If we are fooling ourselves about all these matters, then
whom-or what-are we fooling?
Id.

63.
A typical first source, legal opinions defining creativity, does not prove fruitful. As was
the case in Feist, the opinions either do not attempt to define the term, see Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am.
Games, Inc., No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 1-6 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1347
(8th Cir. 1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831), or define it on a "we will recognize it when we
see it" basis, see Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[creativity] simply
means a work independently created by its author, one not copied from pre-existing works, and a
work that comes from the exercise of the creative powers of the author's mind, in other words, the
fruits of the author's intellectual labor." (quotation marks and citations omitted)). The Boisson
court's definition of creativity is no more than saying, "creativity is creative."
64. See generally Deborah K. Smith, David B. Paradice, & Steven M. Smith, Prepare Your
Mindfor Creativity, 43 COMM. OF THE ACM 110, 111 (July 2000); Linda Candy & Ernest Edmonds,
Introducing Creativity to Cognition, CREATIVITY & COGNITION 3 (1999).
65.
Donald W. MacKinnon, Creativity: A Multi-faceted Phenomenon, in CREATIVITY: A
DIscUSSION AT THE NOBEL CONFERENCE 17, 19 (John D. Roslansky ed., 1970).

66. "Anything that is experienced or made by man... may be a creative product." Id. at 24.
67. The description of a creative process is more complicated than of a creative product,
containing a series of steps that lead from a perceived problem to a solution-"a complex set of
cognitive and motivational processes, and emotional processes too, that are involved in perceiving,
remembering, imagining, appreciating, thinking, planning, deciding, and the like." Id. at 20-21.
68. There is an indication in Feist that the Court was concerned with both of these aspects of
creativity:
[Burrow-Giles] described copyright as being limited to 'original intellectual conceptions
of the author,' and stressed the importance of requiring an author who accuses another of
infringement to prove 'the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception.' The originality requirement articulated in ...BurrowGiles remains the touchstone of copyright protection today.
Feist, 499 U.S. at346-47 (internal citations omitted).
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authors who never created any others.69 The law should be interested in
how the work was generated, not in any inherent characteristics of the
author's personality. Similarly, being in a creative situation is irrelevant
to evaluating whether an expression satisfies the intellectual creativity
requirement of the law as, again, it is the results that are important. For
example, although many institutions of higher education have established
highly creative environments in which to work, 0 this does not mean that
a telephone directory created at one of these institutions is copyrightable. 7 Accordingly, the analysis for copyright purposes should be focused on the product and the way it was produced.
A product can be creative in its own right. Most people who examine a painting by Monet, read a play by Shakespeare, or listen to a symphony by Beethoven would describe the work as creative without any
concern as to how the work was generated. Therefore, it would be possible for the law to only concern itself with the product. However, there is
a potential problem with so narrow an analysis. If only the product is
examined with no examination of methodology of production, it will
prove impossible to separate human-generated creative works from those
generated by sophisticated computer programs based on autonomous
artificial intelligence techniques.72 For these latter works, it would not
only be difficult to establish a requisite amount of intellectual creativity,
it would be impossible to establish origin creativity.73 Consequently, a
combination of techniques is needed: a creative product is apparently
in the product must be the result of a humanrequired, but the creativity
74
based creative process.

See, e.g., HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (winner of the Pulitzer Prize for
69.
Fiction in 1961). As far as anyone knows, Ms. Lee has not produced another work. See Other Work
by Harper Lee, available at http://mockingbird.chebucto.org/otherwork.htmI (last modified May 25,
2000). Of course, the same was thought of Mr. Toole's great work on New Orleans, A Confederacy
of Dunces. JOHN KENNEDY TOOLE, A CONFEDERACY OF DUNCES (1980). The book was published
posthumously after the author committed suicide at the age of thirty-one and also was a Pulitzer
Prize winning work. For years, this appeared to be Mr. Toole's only work, but in 1989 an additional
novel, THE NEON BIBLE, was published.
Simple measurements of this are the quantity and quality of the academic work done by
70.
the faculty of the institution and the degree of success alumni of the institution have.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
71.
Autonomous artificial intelligence requires the creation of a computer program that is
72.
"artificially intelligent" by being capable of producing new expressive works. Clifford, Creative
Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1677-80. Further, the program must be "autonomous" allowing
it to operate without requiring the programmer to specify, or even understand, how to generate the
new work. See id. at 1694 & n.124. For example, the program described in Creative Computer
Programwas able to generate novel musical compositions despite the fact that its creator could not.
Id.
See Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5, at 1694-95; See generally
73.
DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAtD 606-09 (1979)
(discussing philosophical rights to claim authorship between an "author" and a "meta-author" where
the author is the creative computer program and the meta-author is the creator of the computer
program).
This does not mean that the product must necessarily be completely created by human
74.
labor. The use of mechanical assistance to produce the work has long been acceptable. Writers have
their typewriters (or now computers); painters have their brushes (or now computers) and musicians
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In an examination of the creative process, Professor Csikszentmihalyi's description serves as a useful starting point:
The creative process has traditionally been described as taking five
steps. The first is a period of preparation, becoming immersed, consciously or not, in a set of problematic issues that are interesting and
arouse curiosity ....The second phase of the creative process is a
period of incubation, during which ideas churn around below the
threshold of consciousness ....The third component of the creative
process is insight, sometimes called the "Aha!" moment ...The
fourth component is evaluation, when the person must decide
whether the insight is valuable and worth pursuing ....The fifth and
last component of the process is elaboration ....[T]his classical analytic framework leading from preparation to elaboration gives a severely distorted picture of the creative process [as it] is less linear
than recursive. 75
Professor Csikszentmihalyi's conclusion that the process is not linear is important. The various steps of creativity occur simultaneously.
Specifically, "We often talk of our mental activities as being subdivided
among sensing, thinking, and acting phases. But trouble arises because
few things happen at one point in time and space. All of the interesting
actions in the brain involve spatiotemporal patterns of cellular activity
,,76

However, his description of the process as "recursive" is too limiting to be fully accurate. Recursive systems are comprised of a linear approach to a problem that is repeated multiple times on the same subject.77
For example, the process of writing often becomes recursive as it enters
the editing stage. What was written is examined and changed to more
accurately set forth the thoughts of the author. Then, the edited version is
re-edited recursively until the author is satisfied with the results. This
iterative approach of taking an object that is the result of a particular
process and reapplying the same process to it makes the approach recursive.

have their violins (or now computers), all without adversely affecting the copyrightability of the
work they produce. It is only where the computer replaces the human's creativity that the existence
of a copyright becomes questionable. See Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5, at
1686-87.
75. CsiKszENTMIHALyI, supra note 25, at 79-80. Professor Csikszentmihalyi's definitional
approach to a creative process is quite similar to the five part definition provided by Professor
MacKinnon. Compare id. with MacKinnon, supra note 65, at 20.
76. WLLIAM H. CALvIN, How BRAINS THINK 43 (1996) [hereinafter CALVIN I].
77. See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1614 (2d ed. 1993) ("pertaining to or
using a rule or procedure that can be applied repeatedly"). See generally John McCarthy, Recursion,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1507-09 (Anthony Ralston et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000)
(describing mathematical and computer-based recursive functions and how they work).
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While this recursive reworking of an expression is not irrelevant to
the ultimate work's creativity, it misses a very important aspect of it;
indeed, the aspect of it most associated with a "creative spark", Professor
Csikszentmihalyi's "Aha! moment." 79 It is becoming increasingly clear
that the moment of inspiration that underlies intellectual creativity cannot
be linear or even just recursive. 80 Think, for a moment, of the slang term
"couch potato" for someone who watches too much television.81 While
many individuals may sit on a couch to watch television, a direct connection to the word "potato" does not exist. When the term was coined 82 it
seems impossible that any formulaic and deterministic transformation
resulted in the two words being combined. Likewise, there does not seem
to be any process that could be applied and then reapplied to the words,
or the concepts, "couch" and "potato" that would transform them into the
modem slang term for an obsessive television watcher. Something more
is needed or, to be more accurate, something less is required.
There is increasing scientific evidence that chance is the primary
source for novel thoughts. 83 As Professor Calvin describes it,84 creative85
be generated in a process that starts with chance, noise,
thoughts can
or an error 86 within the brain.

78. As Willa Cather reportedly said, "It is not the writing but the rewriting that counts." Elsie
Goth Marshall, 1936: Red Cloud, THE NEBRASKA ALUMNUS (1936), available at
http://www.unl.edu/Catherlworks/nonfiction/bohlke/interviewsl1936.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
79.
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 25, at 79-80. Itis also important to recognize that the
"aha! moment" may be of very low significance. Many ideas recognized as creative by the scientific
community will be significantly less than a theory that unifies physics. See Lawrence W. Barsalou &
Jesse J. Prinz, Mundane Creativity in Perceptual Symbol Systems, in CREATIVE THOUGHT 267
(Thomas B. Ward et al., eds. 1997) (describing the type of creativity that underlies everyday activities); Smith, supra note 64, at 111-12 & figures I& 2 (providing descriptions and examples of the
continuum of creativity).
80. See CALVIN I, supra note 76, at 29 ("[Situdies of chaos and complexity have been teach").Cf JAMES H. AUSTIN, CHASE, CHANCE, AND
ing us [that] determinism is really a nonissue ....
CREATIVITY: THE LUCKY ART OF NOVELTY 69 (MIT Press ed. 2003) ("[Slerendipity [results from]
").
unexpected good luck, as the result of accident and sagacity ....
81. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 460 (2d ed. 1993). To understand why the
author chose this term as an example, cf Paul Thagard, Coherent and Creative Combinations, in
THOMAS B. WARD, ET AL., CREATIVE THOUGHT 138-39 (1997) (describing the author's first expo-

sure to the term "web potato"). Although Thagard's article addresses how we understand, rather than
create, novel expressions, itnevertheless provides an excellent example to consider the nondeterministic way our minds generate new thoughts.
82. The 1976 creation of the term is attributed to Robert Armstrong, a cartoonist, who also
illustrated. JACK MINGO, THE OFFICIAL COUCH POTATO HANDBOOK (1983). See
http://www.sjvls.orglcgi-binlbens_02/100455 (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
83. See WILLIAM H. CALVIN, THE CEREBRAL CODE 21 (1996) [hereinafter CALVIN 11]
(among the six "essential aspects" of creativity are that "[v]ariant patterns ... be produced by
chance.").
84. Id.
at 66 (the "pitter-patter of inputs" from outside of the brain can change the brain's
85. Cf id.
response). To a limited extent, taking advantage of noise to generate creative ideas has been con-

firmed. An artificial intelligence researcher named Stephen Thaler used noise to cause a neural
network of computers to produce novel designs for such things as automobiles. See Stephen Thaler,
Neural Nets that Createand Discover, PC AL May-June 1996, at16-18.
86. Cf CALVIN 1,supra note 83, at 100 (noting that creative thoughts require "relaxing error
correction" to ideas being formed).
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Our more intelligent mental states are sometimes said to flirt around
the "edge of chaos." This term is from complexity theory, which en-

visages an adaptive system that ranges between a rigid order and a
more flexible disorder, controlling the degree of permitted disorder.
We may range from satisfaction at getting something right (convergent thinking) to blue-sky divergent thinking; in those more creative
moments, some of our cortical systems may be poised near the edge
87
of chaos.

When described as being near the edge of chaos or chaotic, a reference is being made to the scientific and mathematic theory of chaos that

was first postulated in the late twentieth century. 88 The theory establishes
that complex deterministic systems, those labyrinthine systems where the
output is controlled by the input, 89 can generate patterns that appear random despite their deterministic nature. 9° To be considered complex under the theory, the system must be sensitive to the initial conditions affecting the system 9' and subject to feedback where the current status of
the system serves as one of the inputs that controls its next status. 92 For
example, consider an avalanche. The inputs for an avalanche include the
quantity of accumulated snow flakes, the topology of the particular
mountain slope, the vegetation on the mountain, the current weather pattern, and a perturbing event such as a loud sound, an extreme skier, or
even one more snow flake. 9 3 Avalanches are sensitive to these starting

conditions-without snow, for example, no avalanche will occur. The
primary feedback affecting the system is the quantity and quality of snow
already on the mountain. Although the inputs are understood, knowing
exactly when an avalanche will occur is impossible.) 4 Sometimes, one
extra snow flake will cause an avalanche while other times it will not,
even where all of the other initial conditions on the mountain appear to
be the same.95 Thus, avalanche occurrences can be described as chaotic.

87.

Id. at 67.

88.
Tony Crilly, The Roots of Chaos--a BriefGuide, in FRACrALS AND CHAOS 193, 193 (A.J.
Crilly et al. eds., 1991).
89.
See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 542 (2d ed. 1993) ("determinism" de-

scribes the theory that "all events.., have sufficient cause.").
90. Crilly, supra note 88, at 195. See Mike King, The New Metaphysics and the Deep Structure of Creativity and Cognition, in CREATIVITY & COGNITION 93, 95 (1999).
91.
Crilly, supra note 88, at 196-97.
An essential hallmark of chaos ... is the extreme sensitivity of the system to initial conditions .... [This] is popularly known as the 'butterfly effect,' because the single flap of

a butterfly's wings would theoretically alter the initial conditions of a ...
could thus give rise to drastically different... patterns at a later time.

system and

Id.
92.
JOHN BIGGS, FRACTALS: THE PATrERNS OF CHAOS 19 (1992).
93.
See National Snow & Ice Data Center, Avalanche Awareness
http://nsidc.org/snow/avalanche/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).

94.
95.

5 (Dec. 22, 2002),

Cf id. [ 9 (defining a sliding scale of input factors that increase the risk of avalanche).
See BIGGS, supra note 92, at 18 (Chaotic systems "exhibit[] an extreme sensitivity to their

initial conditions. The very slight difference in their starting points [make] a very large difference in

their fates.").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

While a fundamental characteristic of chaos is unpredictability, this
within a domain that is known as the system's
uncertainty will occur
"strange attractor." 96 Although a chaotic system is "unpredictable in de97
tail, one can predict the patterns and ranges of a system's movement.
For example, it may be unpredictable with any certainty when an avalanche will occur, but there is an outside boundary of conditions where
the probability of an avalanche becomes certain. If there is too much
snow and the mountain slope is too steep, an avalanche will occur although it may be impossible to predict exactly when. This pattern of
where the system's conditions will trigger the chaotic event is called its
strange attractor. 98 Understanding the strange attractor associated with a
chaotic system is highly advantageous as it sets forth the system's outermost limits and can be used to make predictions about the system's behavior. 99 In other words, the system's strange attractor makes it possible
to understand globally what is impossible to predict locally.
Suggesting that the brain's chaotic nature is a-or even the-source
of human creativity is increasingly common.t00 Like an avalanche, the
brain is a complex system that is sensitive to its environment and is subject to feedback. There are an estimated 100 billion neurons in a human
brain,' 0 ' each of which connects to between 1,000 and 10,000 others.' 0 2
This gives a total of approximately 1.0 x 1080 different paths for a signal
to follow though the brain.' 0 3 The brain perceives its environment
through the five systems of sensory apparatuses-hearing, taste, smell,
vision and touch--each of which is itself complex.1°4 The use of feedback within the brain has been recognized' 0 5 and is easily demonstrated.
Consider a person who is on a diet. His or her brain receives a signal
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

Crilly, supra note 88, at 200-02.
BIGGS, supra note 92, at 18, 21.
Crilly, supra note 88, at 200.
See id. at 202.
See, CALVIN 11,supra note 83, at 21 (the "six essential aspects of the creative darwinian

(sic) process [include that vlariant patterns must sometimes be produced by chance."). See also,
Henry Krystal & Andrew D. Krystal, Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience in Relationship to Dreams
and Creative, in CREATIVrITY AND AFFECr 185, 196 (Melvin P. Shaw & Mark A. Runco eds., 1994)

("One critical feature of any model of creativity is the ability to generate novel behavior. As we shall
see below, 'chaotic,' nonlinear systems are capable of generating novel, unpredictable behavior and
are, therefore, useful models of creativity."). Cf CALVIN I, supra note 76, at 29 ("[A]s studies of
chaos and complexity have been teaching us, determinism is really a nonissue.").
101.
Sci. Am. Frontiers, Changing Your Mind (Dec. 22, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org
/saf/ 110 /teachinglteaching2.htm [hereinafter Changing Your Mind] (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). If, as
current research indicates, the Glial cells also play an important role in the thought process, the

number of involved cells would grow to almost ten times this number. See R. Douglas Fields, The
Other Half of the Brain, SCI. AM., Apr. 2004, at 55.
Brain Facts & Figures (Dec. 22, 2002), available at http://faculty.washingon.eduichudler
102.
/facts.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Brain Facts & Figures].
Changing Your Mind, supra note 101.
103.
104.
See Brain Facts & Figures, supra note 102 (indicating that approximately 100,000,000
neurons are in the auditory cortex and about 538,000,000 neurons are in the visual cortex) (last

visited Feb. 5, 2005). Along with the external senses, the brain receives internal signals about the
body's condition, e.g., hunger.
See CALVIN I, supra note 76, at 126 (describing "round-trip[s]" of neural signals).
105.
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from the body indicating hunger.' °6 The brain's first response is to obtain
some food. This first thought, though, is reprocessed (if the diet is successful) and rejected, as satisfying the hunger will interfere with the diet.
The reprocessing is a form of feedback as one thought triggers another.
Given inputs, complexity, and feedback, chaos is the result.' 07 Thus,
understanding intellectual creativity requires it to be considered against
the background of chaos. Intellectual creativity may represent nothing
more than the brain taking advantage of its own static.
How the brain functions despite the environment of chaos requires
consideration of how a thought is generated within the brain. It is fairly
08
well established that different neurons within the brain are specialists. 1
The ones associated with thought, and presumably creativity, are located
in the cerebral cortex. 1°9 As a thought is being formed, "I am eating an
orange," for example, different groups of neurons are triggered to react.
For example, the neurons associated with an orange color, a round shape,
a juicy mouth-feel, a citrus smell, and a citrus taste may all fire.' 10 When
enough of these neurons discharge, the electrochemical signals generated
are described by a strange attractor in the brain that is associated with
orange-ness.1" Of course, as the brain deals with electrochemical signals,
if the neuron activation pattern in the brain occurs, the thought will be
formed even if the actual experience is not being had. One does not need
to be eating an orange to be able to savor the orange-ness of the experience.
To appreciate the next step, how these generated thoughts reach the
level of consciousness, it is important to remember that the brain generates a multitude of thoughts simultaneously." 2 While current science
cannot provide a definitive understanding of the details that underlie how
one thought becomes central over others,' 13 there is a basic conceptual
framework. Professor Calvin posits that there must be a yet unobserved
mechanism of copying that propagates a particular idea as represented in
a neuron in the brain, what he terms a "cerebral code," through more and
more neurons." 4 Eventually, a sufficient number of neurons adopt the
same cerebral code, establishing a "committee" of neurons to fully de106.
For example, the neurotransmitter known as neuropeptide Y appears to trigger hunger. See
Emory Researchers Find Hunger Regulated by Novel Neurotransmitter, available at

http://whsc.emory.edu/_releases/1998may/O50198yerkes.htn-l (last modified May 8, 1998).
107. See BIGcS, supra note 92, at 19.
108. See CALVIN 1,supra note 76, at 118-20.
109. See CALVIN IL supra note 83, at 52. But cf.James M. Bower & Lawrence M. Parsons,
Rethinking the "LesserBrain, " ScI. AM., Aug., 2003, at 51 (discussing recent research that is establishing a more important role for the cerebellum).
110.
111.

See CALVIN U, supra note 83, at 108.
See id.

112.

Cf.id. at 137 (describing how the brain processes multiple ideas).

113.

Cf.id. at 123.

114.

Seeid. at 121.
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velop the thought with its various associations."15 To explain how a particular thought reaches consciousness from all of the thoughts occurring
simultaneously, Professor Calvin proposes a Darwinian selection process. 116 The thought that recruits the largest number of additional neurons
to serve on its committee reaches cognizance." 7 Professor Calvin's theory has received increasing support from other researchers.118
The process described above does not seem capable of generating a
creative thought, however, as it appears only capable of regenerating
thoughts that have already occurred. Yet, several things can go "wrong"
in the process that can trigger new thoughts.
First, a pattern of neurons might fire that are a novel combination.
While the brain may attempt to force this new pattern to fit within one
already known, if different enough, it may keep it separate and start establishing a new attractor. 119 "Thinking outside of the box" demonstrates
this. In this process, people deliberately attempt to come up with novel
solutions to a problem. This is achieved by trying to force the brain to
create a new attractor for an existing pattern of thought. Of course, it
does not need to be intentional. Most of us have had the experience of
having two unrelated thoughts in juxtaposition lead to a novel conclusion.
Alternatively, although the neural pattern is the same, it may not
trigger the same attractor. As a result, the conscious mind will interpret
the pattern differently.120 For whatever reason, although an orange is
seen, the conscious mind thinks about rabbits.
Either of these methods will generate a novel thought. Sometimes
this is deliberate, but for many "aha"-type moments, the novel thought
appears to come from nowhere. In these cases, the chaos in the brain
provides a compelling explanation. Whether it was the random firing of
neurons or a random creation of a new attractor, a new thought is generated that successfully recruits sufficient neuron support to reach consciousness. However, whatever novelty is found only exists because of
the chaos in the brain and is, effectively, capricious. Consequently, crea115.
116.
117.
118.

See
See
See
See

id. at 127-28.
id. at 150-51.
id.
Michael Shermer, The Major Unsolved Problems in Biology, Sci. AM., Mar. 2004, at

103-04 (indicating that "a Darwinian fashion of neuronal variation and selection.., has considerable support from neuroscience research."). Professor Calvin's proposal has also obtained a support
from workers in artificial intelligence as a computer program using a similar technique has been able
to discover new inventions that are novel enough to be considered patentable. See John R. Koza,
Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Streeter, Evolving Inventions, SCI. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52.
119.
Professor Calvin describes the old thoughts as "cerebral ruts" which "predispose [the

cerebral cortex] to produce a repertoire of spatiotemporal patterns [already known)." CALviN 1,
supra note 76, at 109. He indicates, however, that new patterns can be created, even at the expense
of those already established. Id.
120. The source of puns, perhaps?
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tivity, far from being the brain's highest form of thought, may indeed be
its lowest. If it were not for the randomness generated by our physically
complex electrochemical brains, our ability to engender novel thoughts
might be no greater than that of an earthworm.
IV.

121
WE'VE GOT TROUBLE RIGHT HERE IN COPYRIGHT CITY

The increased focus on the "creative" effort necessary to produce a
work for which a22copyright is claimed (particularly the use of the term
"creative spark")1 in FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service

Co. 123 has introduced significant difficulties for courts trying to determine the scope of copyright. Courts often declare that the plaintiff's
work is insufficiently creative, consequently lacking a subsisting copyright. 124 Unfortunately, the decisions do not follow any uniform theory,125 stating only that the work lacks "creativity," thus failing to articu121.
With apologies to MEREDITH WILSON, Ya Got Trouble, from THE MUSIC MAN (Angel
1957) ("Oh, we've got trouble right here in River City .
122. Feist,499 U.S. at 345.
123. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
124. See, e.g., Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (photographs of art works in the public domain lack sufficient creativity for copyright); Stuart Entre't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19,
1998) (computer-generated bingo cards lack sufficient creativity for copyright), aft'd, 205 F.3d 1347
(8th Cir. 1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831); Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d
276, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Bible code" lacks sufficient creativity for copyright).
125. To be clear, it is not the author's position that the courts have failed totally in applying
Feist's intellectual creativity requirement. When dealing with a database-a "clearly identified
collection of data, such as a telephone book . .. " WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcIONARY OF
COMPUTER TERMS 145 (5th ed. 1994)-the courts have done a better job, at least at the appellate
level. Compare Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 190 F. Supp. 2d 652, 659 (D. Vt. 2002) (finding that
a database was not sufficiently creative as awhole), rev'd, 45 Fed. App. 68, 2002 WL 31007386 (2d
Cir. 2002) with Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. App. 68, 71, 2002 WL 31007386 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding that the database was sufficiently creative when its component parts were examined).
Of course, the work litigated in Feist was a database, see Feist,499 U.S. at 342-44, which may have
eased the difficulty for the lower courts of applying intellectual creativity standards.
As was the case in Feist, most databases are collections of facts which, in themselves, are
not copyrightable. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 681 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999). The only protectable aspect of a factual database,
therefore, comes from the selection of the facts, see Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863
(2d Cir. 1984) (database resulting from the selection of the "best" baseball cards was copyrightable),
the way the facts are expressed, see Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. App. 68, 71, 2002 WL
31007386 at *3 (2d Cir. 2002) (written description of tree species may qualify for copyright protection), Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804,
810 (D. Md. 1995) ("marketing puffery" contained in database is copyrightable), affd 91 F.3d 132
(4th Cir. 1996) (table), or in the way the database is organized, cf.Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d
262, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2001) (the arrangement of the letters of the alphabet on a quilt was a sufficiently creative arrangement to warrant copyright protection). Even with these protections, as many
commentators have argued, copyright provides limited protection for a factual database, particularly
one seeking to be comprehensive rather than selective. See, e.g., Henry Beck, Copyright Protection
for Compilationsand Databases after Feist, 8 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 1 (1991) (Feist "may have
set the stage for a veritable 'gold rush' of information reorganization, reconstruction and redistribution by persons other than those who have collected and compiled the information in the first instance."); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat?" Copyright and Other Protection of Works ofInformation
after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 339 (1992) ("The Court thus stripped away
or sharply reduced the copyright protection afforded a variety of 'information products,' from directories and mailing lists to computerized databases."); Susan H. Nycum, Protection of Electronic
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late a workable definition of creativity, in particular, one that incorporates an understanding of creativity's physiological sources. This leaves
the declared law incapable of being reconciled and of little help in predicting future results. A few examples will establish this premise.
A.

Works Based on Nature

Satava v. Lowry 12 6 is a remarkable case. The plaintiff Satava was an
artist in glass. 127 He created a glass sculpture of a jellyfish floating in a
larger glass envelope. 128 The defendant Lowry made a very similar sculpture. 129 In proceedings under the Copyright Act seeking a preliminary
injunction, the district court determined that Satava was likely to succeed
in the action and enjoined Lowry from making sculptures that were substantially similar to Satava's. 30 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the trial court used an improper legal standard. 13 ' To justify its decision,
the court stated two obvious propositions: that to qualify for a copyright,
a work must contain creative expression, and that the copyright obtained
did not extend to any ideas, facts, or public domain material contained
within the work. 132 The court then examined Satava's sculpture and determined that effectively everything in the work of art lacked creativity
as it was an idea or something else that was in the public domain. 133 As
examples, the court discounted any creativity in a glass-in-glass jellyfish
'1
as that design "naturally follow[s] from the idea of such a sculpture."'
The court also disallowed Satava from claiming "aspects of his sculptures resulting from either jellyfish
physiology or from their depiction in
' 35
the glass-in-glass medium."'
Satava's combination of elements that made up his sculpture fared
no better with the court. While acknowledging "that a combination of

Databases, 14 No. 8 COMPUTER LAW. 12, 14 (1997) ("Because many databases consist of content
like
that
inthe Feistcase, they do not qualify forcopyright protection.").
Of course, not all databases collect facts. If the database is comprised of non-factual data,
its copyright is much broader. See CCC Info. Serv. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44
F.3d 61, 64-68 (2d Cir. 1994) (database of used car prices copyrightable as the prices were the
author's opinion, not facts), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995); CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256,
1260 (9th Cir. 1999) (same for database of coin prices).
126.
323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 983 (2003).
127.
Satava, 323 F.3d at 807.
128.
Id. A photoreproduction of the sculpture can be seen in the opinion on page 808 and can
be viewed online at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/
FE4764BC4E4D78A788256CEE00814B67/$file/0216347.pdf?openelement

(last visited Dec. 7,

2003).
129.
Satava, 323 F.3d at 808-09. Mr. Lowry's sculpture is likewise reproduced in the court's
opinion on page 809 and can be found on the Ninth Circuit's web page.
130.
Id. at 809 n.2.
131.

Id.at810.

132.

Id.

133.

Seeid. at810-1l.

134.

Id.at810.

135.

Id.
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unprotectable elements may qualify for copyright protection,"1' 36 the
court determined that Satava's jellyfish statue failed to meet the Feist
creativity standard. 37 Specifically, "The selection of the clear glass, oblong shroud, bright colors, proportion, vertical orientation, and stereotyped jellyfish form, considered together, ' lacked
the quantum of original38
ity needed to merit copyright protection."'
To appreciate the difficulties that the rule established in Satava will
cause, consider the following hypothetical judicial opinion:
Both parties have created statues of men that are remarkably similar
to each other. Despite the defendant's apparent copying of the plaintiff's work, the plaintiff's claim of copyright infringement must fail.
The individual elements of plaintiffs statue are completely dictated
by the fact that a life-like sculpture of a man was made. As a result,
such elements as the legs, arms, torso, and head of the sculpture are
not included within the plaintiffs copyright, nor can the actual look
or position of any of these items be claimed in so far as they are dictated by the physiological shape and movement of a human male.
Further, the sculpture is not qualified for a copyright as a combination as "[tihe selection of the [marble], [pedestal], [white] color[],
proportion, vertical orientation, and stereotyped [human] form, considered together, lacks the quantum of originality needed to merit
copyright protection." Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 472 (2003). Consequently, the statue entitled,
"Michelangelo's David"'139 is not sufficiently creative to be protected
by copyright.
Through the hypothetical, the consequences of Satava become
clear. Under it, all realistic art seems to be excluded from the ambit of
copyright protection. The court interpreted the Feist intellectual creativity requirement without also giving credit to the copyright doctrine of
preventing copying. 40 While there may have been a question in Satava

of whether the defendant's jellyfish sculpture was a substantially similar

136.
137.
138.

Id. at 811 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.

139.
A photograph of this well-known statue is available at http://pharaohs.addr.com/david.jpg
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005). This statue is generally acknowledged to be one of Michelangelo's best
works and one of the most important sculptures of the Renaissance. See H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF

ART 425 (2d ed. 1977). Obviously, for the sake of the hypothetical, it must be assumed that Michelangelo produced the statue contemporaneously.
140. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) ("Others are free
to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy."). See also Superior Form Builders, Inc. v.
Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir.) (holding that realistic animal sculptures are copyrightable), cert. denied 519 U.S. 809 (1996); Masquerade Novelty, Inc., v. Unique

Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 671 (3d Cir. 1990); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193
F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir. 1951), affd 344 U.S. 228 (1952) (only addressing damages); Prestige Floral,
S.A. v. Cal. Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that realistic
flower sculptures are copyrightable).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

copy of the plaintiff's work, 141 there should have been no question that
the plaintiff's sculpture was sufficiently creative for a copyright to subsist. 142

The Satava court made three fundamental mistakes in its decision.
First, it misconstrued the origin creativity requirement by necessitating
that the work not be modeled on anything,143 not just on a pre-existing
work.inn Second, the Satava court seemed to ignore the full consequences
of the plaintiff having obtained certificates of registration from the Copyright Office. 145 Once obtained, the plaintiff's works are presumed to be
copyrightable,' 46 including that sufficient originality was demonstrated in
their creation. 47 Finally, and most importantly, the Satava court improperly imported a patent-like novelty requirement into copyright. After all,
both the plaintiffs and defendant's works can be copyrighted even
though they depict
jellyfish as long as the defendant did not copy the
48
plaintiffs work.

B.

Works Based on Random Numbers andAlgorithms

Another area of extraordinary difficulty for the courts results from
works created using computer technology, particularly when the computer software is responsible for making choices as to the final expressive elements which will appear in the work. Two cases merit consideration:
1.

The Stuart EntertainmentDecision

In Stuart Entertainment,Inc. v. American Games, Inc.,' 49 the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant from copying a series of bingo cards
it had developed.150 To generate the series, a computer program was used
141.

Satava, 323 F.3d at 807, 809 (photoreproduction of plaintiff's work and defendant's

work).
142.

Cf. Satava, 323 F.3d at 807, 809, with Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc.,

18 F.3d 502, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing impact of life-like elements on the evaluation of
whether there is infringement, but not questioning the creativity of the plaintiffs work).
143.
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810.
144.
See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 268 (originality includes that it is "not copied from pre-existing
works") (emphasis added); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th
Cir. 2003) ("[Copyright] requires only enough originality to enable a work to be distinguished from
similar works that are in the public domain, since without some discernible distinction it would be

impossible to determine whether a subsequent work was copying a copyrighted work or a publicdomain work.") (citations omitted, emphasis added). Cf Bridgeman Art Library, 36 F. Supp. 2d at

195-97 (holding that exact copies of preexisting works of art have no subsisting copyright).
145.
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 807.
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000).
147. See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 269.
148. See id. at 270 ("Absent evidence of copying, an author is entitled to copyright protection
for an independently produced original work despite its identical nature to a prior work, because it is
independent creation, and not novelty that is required.").

149. No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir.
1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831).
150. Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 1-2.
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that combined a random number generator with selection algorithms to
insure that each bingo card and the series as a whole would be optimally
playable.15 1 The series of cards that was generated represented a mere
9,000 cards 152 out of a universe of more than 11l quadrillion possible
cards. 153 The defendant's series of bingo cards was "an exact, verbatim
copy of the number sequences found in [the plaintiff's] series."' 154 Despite this apparent highly selective choice of bingo cards that made up
the series, however, the court determined that no copyright subsisted as
no "'intellectual labor' was put forth in the creation .. of [the] bingo
cards."1 55 The court held that because the author of the bingo cards had
chosen to "mechanical ly] generat[e]" them, there was no creativity
used. 156
The court's rejection of the mechanical generation of a copyrightable work is inconsistent with Feist.15 7 Assume that the bingo card had
been generated by hand. As the Feist decision indicated, one indicator of
sufficient intellectual creativity for a compilation is whether the author
selected items to be included within the compilation from a larger universe of choices. 158 Stuart satisfied this selection as a minuscule percentSee id., slip op. at 2-3. Among the selection algorithms used were that each card gener151.
ated had to be unique within the series, that each of the numbers on a bingo card (from 1 to 75)
would occur approximately an equal number of times within the series, and that each row and column within the series would be unique. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-13, Stuart Entertainment, Inc. v. American Games, Inc., 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1336).
152.
See Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 4.
153.
See Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., 205 F.3d
1347 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1336).
154.
Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 4.
Id., slip. op. at 15.
155.
156.
Id., slip. op. at 16.
157.
Indeed, the district court seemed to have much difficulty with many basic copyright
concepts, not just the creativity requirement. In its penultimate paragraph, for example, the court
expressed concern that if one of the plaintiffs series of bingo cards was considered copyrightable,
this would allow the plaintiff to preemptively protect all other series of bingo cards. See Stuart, No.
1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 18 ("If the Court, today, were to grant protection to Champion C, Stuart
would be in this or some other federal court next week . . . to protect its many other Champion
series.").
While it is tre that Stuart may have sought to protect its other series of bingo cards, it
could only protect them against the statutorily designated types of infringing conduct such as copying. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). American Games, or anyone else, would, of course, be free to
independently generate its own sequence of bingo cards, even if this newly created sequence was
identical to the original Stuart sequence. See Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d
275, 275 (2d Cir. 1936) ("independent reproduction of a copyrighted... work is not infringement").
All that would be prohibited by Stuart's copyright would be copying its sequence of cards. See
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249 ("Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the
copy."). Indeed, American Games would have been free to attempt to reverse engineer the cards to
derive the algorithms that Stuart had established for a playable series of cards and used them to build
its own series, as the ideas expressed within the algorithms are not within the scope of copyright
protections. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Cf Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (reverse engineering copyrighted software to develop competing
software is fair use). Had American Games done this, they would have a resulting set of bingo cards
that are just as playable as Stuart's, but would not have been a copy.
158.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
Where the compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the facts speak
for themselves, the expressive element is more elusive. The only conceivable expression
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age of the possible bingo cards were chosen, 159 and, significantly, the
selection was based on the author's opinion of what defined a highly
playable series of bingo cards.160 Rather than being a random sequence of
bingo cards as the court seemed to conclude,' 61 they were a carefully
crafted set of cards to maximize bingo players' enjoyment of the game.
Thus, as was the case with the baseball cards in Eckes v. Card Prices
Update,162 the bingo card series represented an expression of Stuart's
opinion of what constituted a highly playable group of cards, clearly
meeting Feist'sintellectual creativity requirement.
Therefore, the district court's rejection of the cards must have been
based on the use of technology to generate the cards. 163 Where there
would be intellectual creativity if the work was generated by manual
labor, however, the use of technology to achieve the more mechanical
aspects of a work should not lead to a deprivation of copyright protection. 64 The modest amount of intellectual creativity demonstrated by
Stuart when it defined the algorithms to be used to choose a limited subset of bingo cards for its compilation satisfies the Feist test, and the use
of a random number generator as part of the technology to express Stuis the manner in which the compiler has selected and arranged the facts. Thus, if the selection and arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright
protection.
Id.
159. Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 4. (Stuart's 9,000 cards represented approximately
0.0000000000008% of the possible bingo cards).
160. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Stuart Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Games, Inc., 205 F.3d
1347 (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1336) ("a number of optional criteria [were] chosen to increase the
market appeal of the [cards]"); Id. at 17 ("Stuart Entertainment ... remove[d] this feature ... to
meet perceived consumer demand.").
161.
See Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 16. (the bingo cards are chosen by a "randomizer").
162. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 861 (database resulting from the selection of the "best" baseball cards
was copyrightable). See supra note 125 (discussing Eckes and the copyrightability of collections of
facts and opinions).
163.
See Stuart, No. 1-96-CV-90036, slip op. at 16 ("In this mechanical generation of the
bingo cards, the Court finds that there is no originality or creativity expounded by [Stuart].") (emphasis added).
164. See H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible
to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The bill does not intend
either to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion
into areas completely outside the present congressional intent.
Id.
Again, it is important to distinguish between the kind of technology Stuart used and artificially intelligent software. The software used by Stuart did not exercise any creativity; instead,
following the instructions specified by the programmer, it randomly generated possibilities and then
mechanically culled them based on the creative choices previously made by Stuart. With artificially
intelligent software, on the other hand, the human using the software does not exercise any creativity
as the choices of what should be included in the expressive work is "delegated" strictly to the computer. See generally, Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5 (discussing intellectual
property issues associated with works generated by artificial intelligence). Confusing artificial intelligence with a random number generator will result in a fallacious conclusion about the copyrightability of a work. See David Nirmner & Eaton S. Drone, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls:
Authorship and Originality,38 Hous. L. REv. 1, 31, n. 119 (2001).
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art's compilation is, simply, irrelevant to the copyrightability of the collection of cards.
2.

The Torah Soft Decision

Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin165 involved the copyrightability of Bible

code matrixes that were generated by a computer program developed by
the plaintiff. 166 These matrixes are derived from the Hebrew Bible by
selecting letters that are equally spaced throughout the text; for example,
each sixtieth letter, as some believe that the resulting words and phrases
predict the future. 167 The defendant had reproduced about one hundred of
the matrixes, which were generated by the defendant's computer program, in his book on the Bible code.' 68 The district court, in a decision
that relied on several grounds, 169 determined that the matrixes were not
copyrightable. 170 While the ultimate decision that there was not an infringement of copyright seems correct, 17 1 the parts of the opinion that

rely on a lack of intellectual creativity in the work to justify a lack of
copyrightability do not have much strength.
165.
136 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
166. Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
See id. at 280. In fact, the Bible code has no ability to predict the future. See Michael
167.
Shermer, Codified Claptrap, Sa. AM., June 2003, at 35 ("Just like the prophecies of soothsayers
past and present, all such predictions are actually postdictions .... To be tested scientifically, Bible
codes would need to predict events before they happen. They won't, because they can't .... ")
(emphasis added). Indeed, in 1997, Drosnin indicated that the Bible code foretold that the world
would end in the year 2000, which obviously did not occur. See id. See generally, David E. Thomas,
Hidden Messages and The Bible Code, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Nov./Dec. 1997, available at
http://www.csicop.org/si/97 1/bible-code.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
168.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
169. See id. at 284-86 (originality, functional elements, merger doctrine, scenes a faire, and
public domain).
at 292.
170.
See id.
Two, alternate theories justify the court's ultimate conclusion. The defendant only repro171.
duced 100 of the possible matrixes that could be generated by the plaintiff's database and program.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281. As such, any copying would have been de minimus as no
argument was made that the particular codes reproduced in the defendant's book extracted the essence of the plaintiff's database. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d
Cir. 1983); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 542 (3d Cir. 1986). Consequently, although copying occurred, it was not actionable.
Alternately, the defendant had a fairly strong argument that the use of the work was fair
under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Three of the fair use factors strongly favor the defendant: the nature
of the copyrighted work, the amount copied, and the effect on the author's marketplace. See id. §
107(2)-(4). The copyrighted work was, effectively, a work of nonfiction (and one that contained a
significant quantity of public domain material), which suggests a narrower copyright and greater fair
use rights. See Eng'g Dynamics, Inc., v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir.
1994). Only a small portion of the copyrighted work was used. See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at
281. The effect on the defendant's market is likely to be accretive as a book about the Bible code
would more likely cause individuals to acquire computer software to be able to do their own analysis
and could not reasonably be expected to decrease the plaintiffs market.
Only the purpose of the defendant's work-a commercial book-factors against a fair use
finding. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). However, commercial uses do not mandate a finding of a
lack of fair use, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-85 (1994), particularly
when the scope of the transformation of the two works is considered, see id. at 578-79. There is very
little similarity between a computer program and database that can generate Bible codes and a book
written to explain the Bible code.
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The matrixes are comprised of predominately public domain materials found in the Hebrew Bible. 72 There was a minimum of selection
and arrangement performed on the material from the Bible as the plaintiff created his work, however, in the transformation of Hebrew letters
from their final forms into their non-final forms, 17 3 the selection of a version of the Prophets and the Writings to include, 174 and the changes made
75
to the database to comply with 31'l)n (sheimot) requirements.1
The court's conclusion that the substitution of non-final form letters
was insufficiently creative for inclusion within a copyright is clearly correct. 176 As no intellectual effort was needed to make the substitution, the
simplistic, mechanical
alteration is appropriately excluded from the am77
bit of copyright. 1

172. Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 286 ("Plaintiff wisely admits that the Hebrew Bible, which
is the backbone of the Database, is in the public domain ....
").
173. Id. Five Hebrew letters, : (chaph), 3 (mem), I (nun), 0 (pe), and N(tzadhe) have a different form when they appear at the end of a word, 1, 0, 1,c1,
and ', respectively. See POCKET
HEBREW-ENGLISH DICTIONARY iii (Ehud Ben-Yehuda, ed. 1961). These letters in their final form
are called V!0'iV (sophit)as in 3T!. '3 11(nun sophit). See id.
174.
Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 286. Cf. THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY OF AMERICA,
THE HOLY SCRIPTURES vi-ix (1955) (describing the difficulties of translation caused by multiple

versions and versions with marginal corrections and indicating which versions of Prophets and
Writings were chosen for this translation); Interviews with Rabbi Howard L. Jaffe, Temple Isaiah,
Lexington, Massachusetts (May-July, 2003).
175.
TorahSoft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 286. 31))3g, transliterated as sheimot, means a tattered piece
of paper upon which one of the seven Hebrew names of God is written. Joseph Lowin, Naming the
Name, available at httpJ/www.ivrit.org/html /words-roots/pdf/wr 6-7-97.pdf (last visited Dec. 7,
2003). fn'iD=p refers to the tradition among observant Jews to treat any document that has one of the
names of God in Hebrew on it as an object deserving special respect, see id., in recognition of the
command in the Torah "not take the name of Adonai your God in vain," Exodus 20:7, and "you shall
not do so to the Lord, your God," Deuteronomy 12:4. As a consequence, the documents cannot
simply be discarded; instead, they must be disposed of in a way that shows respect. See Rabbi
Joshua Heller, Ekev 5760, available at http://learn.jtsa.edultopics/parashah/5760/ekev.shtml (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005). Further, a name of God should not be written on something where there is an
expectation that the name will be subsequently erased. See Central Conference of American Rabbis,
The Name of God, CCAR RESPONSA § 145, available at http://www.ccarnet.org/cgibin/respdisp.pl?file=145&year=narr (last visited Dec. 1990). This would include the output from the
plaintiffs computer program. See Complaint 16, Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00-Civ-5650(SAS)), available at http://www.thedavidandgoliathshow.com/
Complaint2.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
For an excellent description of the Sheimot rules and their modern consequences, see
Jacob Schneider, "Sheimot" and Their Disposal, J. OF HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y, Fall 1991, at
31.
176.
Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 288-89. At the same time, the Court's reliance on Grove
Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publ'n, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967), was hardly appropriate at
least as far as Grove Press suggests that work that can be done by a high school student lacks creativity. See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (quoting Grove Press v. Collectors Publ'n, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 603,605 (C.D. Cal. 1967)). Nothing in the Feist test, or in reality, suggests that creativity is
necessarily something that is limited to adults. See, e.g., DONALD JAY GROUT, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN MUSIC 499-500 (rev. ed. 1973) (Mozart's "masterwork" Symphony in G minor, K. 183,
was written in 1773 when he was seventeen). Mozart's opera buffa, La Finta Semplice, was written
in 1768 when he was twelve. Id. at 498,
177. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 ("It is equally true, however, that the selection and arrangement
of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.").
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The selection of which version of the Prophets and the Writings to
78
include is more complicated than the court seemed to acknowledge.
While the order of the books within the Torah, the Prophets and the Writings is established, 79 the actual text that makes up these versions does
not appear to be as firmly settled. 180 If there are as few as a handful of
choices, it might be necessary to acknowledge the creativity used in selecting among them. 18 1 Such selection could only represent the author's
opinion about which version is "authentic" and, as an opinion, would
apparently represent intellectual creativity. 82 Further, the court's dismissal of the quantity of work done by the plaintiff to choose which version of the books to use is disingenuous. 183 While the plaintiff's "sweat
of the brow" alone cannot sustain a copyright, just because sweat was
needed to produce the work does not negate the presence of intellectual

creativity. That the plaintiff extensively studied Jewish law and consulted
with scholars of Jewish law shows the intellectual endeavor in which he
was involved to choose the most authentic version of each book. Consequently, if these choices were established by the author at trial,184 sufficient intellectual creativity should have been found by the court.
The alterations made by the plaintiff that most clearly demonstrate
creativity are in the sheimot changes. 85 Rather than using the typical
system used to comply with the sheimot rules, inserting hyphens between
178.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 288. Cf THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY OF
AMERICA, THE HOLY SCRIPTURES vi-ix (1955) (describing the process of translation including the
difficulties caused by such things as marginal corrections to the original text) [hereinafter HOLY
SCRI TURES].
179.
See HOLY SCRIPTURES, supra note 178, at viii.
180.
See id. at viii-ix; David E. Thomas, Follow-up: Bible-Code Developments, SKEPTICAL
INQUIRER, Mar./Apr. 1998, available at http:l/www.csicop.org/si/9803/bible-code.htmil.
[A]ny serious student of the Talmud knows that there are many citations of the Hebrew
Bible which indicate a differing text from the one we have .... One of the oldest complete texts of the Bible, the Leningrad codex (from 1009) (also available electronically)
differs from the Koren version... in forty-one places in Deuteronomy alone. In fact, the
spelling in the Hebrew Bible did not become uniformized until the sixteenth century with
the advent of a printed version that could provide an identical standard text available at
diverse geographical locations.
Id. (quoting Harvard mathematics professor (and Orthodox rabbi) Shlomo Sternberg).
For a list of the principal ancient Hebrew texts of Prophets and Writings, see Ancient Hebrew Manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible, available at http://www.ancient-hebrew.orgl17-manuscripts.html
(2002) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
181.
Cf Boisson, 273 F.3d at 262 (recognizing creativity in placement of the alphabet on a
quilt).
182.
See Eckes, 736 F.2d at 859 (database resulting from the selection of the "best" baseball
cards was copyrightable); Superchips, Inc. v. Street & Performance Elecs., Inc., No.
6:OOCV896ORL31KRS, 2001 WL 697948, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2001) ("Superchips' act of
changing numerical values in Ford's data table to achieve optimum engine performance is [creative]").
183.
See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 288 ("[lit is clearly established that such 'sweat of the
brow' does not confer copyright protection.").
184.
The plaintiff may have failed to prove the existence of multiple choices. See Torah Soft,
136 F. Supp. 2d at 288 ("[Pjlaintiff [has] failed to identify precisely how Spielberg altered the text
185.

See id. at 280-81.
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some or all of the letters comprising a name of God, the plaintiff changed
the letters into other typographic symbols such as asterisks and pound
signs. 186 In this way, the Hebrew names of God would not be included
within the database but, at the same time, the number of characters
within the Bible would not change, making the extraction of the proper
characters of Bible code number possible. Although the court announced
two reasons why the sheimot changes were not creative, that they were
"functional' ' 81 7 and that they were "required by the end-users,"'' 88 both
reasons are nonsensical.
Without a doubt, the sheimot changes implemented by the plaintiff
t89
were incorporated into a functional database and computer program.
But to discount all functional alterations as lacking creativity seriously
misstates the intellectual creativity requirement. It confuses what are
unprotectable functional elements with protectable expressions.1 9 While
a method of operation is appropriately excluded from copyright,192 the
sheimot changes are not used to operate the Bible code program; instead,
the changes serve as the plaintiff's means to express the idea underlying
the sheimot rules.' 93 As a consequence, the sheimot changes are not functional; indeed, the Bible code program would operate just as well, though
offending much of its customer base, without the sheimot changes being
made.
Further, the changes made by the plaintiff were not specifically required by the end-users of the program. Clearly, to appeal to the market,
the plaintiff had to comply with the sheimot rules, but that market would
not care how these rules were implemented. Thus, by selecting one option out of many choices for expressing the sheimot rules, particularly

186.

See id.

187.
188.

Jd. at 287.
Id.

189.
190.

See id. at 278.
See id. at 287 ("As a functional, as opposed to a creative, alteration, the sheimot changes

arc not protectable.").
191.

Indeed, if being functional negates creativity, it is hard to see how any computer program

would qualify for copyright protection despite the clear congressional intent that such protection be
available. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of computer program); H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
116 (1976) ("With respect to the copyrightability of computer programs.... the [1976 Copyright
Act] would apply."); see generally BRIAN W. KERNIGHAN & P.J. PLAUGER, THE ELEMENTS OF
PROGRAMMING STYLE (2d ed. 1978) (discussing how to craft well written programs).

192.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
193. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995).
We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable 'method of operation.' The Lotus menu command hierarchy provides the means by which users control
and operate Lotus 1-2-3 .... Users must use the command terms to tell the computer
what to do. Without the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to access and
control, or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities. The Lotus menu
command hierarchy does not merely explain and present Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities to the user; it also serves as the method by which the program is operated and

controlled.
Id., affd by equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
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where that choice was novel in itself, sufficiently intellectual creativity
was demonstrated.194
C.

Trouble, Trouble, Trouble

As these example cases indicate, works that should qualify for
copyright protection are being denied as the courts misconstrue the Feist
decision. Rather than expecting a work to contain a "minimal degree of
creativity,'' 95 a significantly higher quantum of intellectual creativity is
expected. What could be lost by this unrealistic expectation is that many
of the average, mundane works that constitute a significant percentage of
the expressive works developed and marketed will no longer be protected, making them economically unviable. Whether it is a typical computer program, a statue to be sold to a tourist, a dime-store novel, or a
series of bingo cards, the way that the intellectual creativity requirement
is being formulated in the lower courts is problematic for insuring that
sufficient incentives are available for the authors of these types of
works. 196

The source of the problem may be some unfortunate language in
Feist that requires a work to "possess some creative spark" to be copyrightable t 97 Many courts have seized upon this language' 98 d are expecting a level of creativity worthy of Beethoven before the work will
pass intellectual creativity muster instead of recognizing that the empha-

194. Even the court acknowledges a degree of novelty in the plaintiff's expression of the sheimot rules. See Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (the plaintiff "departed from the traditional method
of complying with the sheimot rules ....").This creativity is further reinforced as the plaintiff's
choice of characters to use in substituting the letters in a Hebrew name of God are arbitrary and were
not required; indeed, any non-Hebrew character would have worked. Cf id. at 280-81.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
195.
196. As an example, in part because of the loss of its intellectual property protection for its
bingo cards, Stuart Entertainment was forced into bankruptcy under Chapter 11. In re Stuart Entm't,
Inc., No. 99-02847-MFW (Bankr. D. Del. filed Aug. 13, 1999).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citation & quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
197.
198. See Matthew Bender & Co.,158 F.3d at 682 (recognizing Nat'l Reporter page numbers,
etc. lack creative spark); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding part numbers lack creative spark); J. Thomas Distribs., Inc., v. Greenline Distribs, Inc., 100 F.3d
956 at *1 (6th Cir. 1996) (table, opinion at 1996 WL 636138) (reasoning drawing of part lacks
creative spark); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding title commitment lacks creative spark), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 990 (1995); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d
1366, 1373 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting command codes lack creative spark); Bridgeman Art Library, 36
F. Supp. 2d at 196-97 (finding photographs reproducing public domain art lack creative spark).
But see Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir.
2002) (finding doll contains sufficient creative spark); O'Well Novelty Co. v. Offenbacher, Inc.. 225
F.3d 655 at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (table, opinion at 2000 WL 1055108) (recognizing porcelain houses
contain sufficient creative spark); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir.
2000) (reasoning photograph of vodka bottle contains sufficient creative spark); Atari Games Corp.
v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cit. 1992) (finding video game contains sufficient creative spark).
The most interesting transformation of the Supreme Court's language may have occurred in Spilman
v. Mosby-Yearbook, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D. Mass. 2000). The Spilman court was not interested in a "creative spark;" rather, it was interested in a "creative twinkle." Id. at 155.
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sis in the decision is to find a minimal level of intellectual creativity. It is
the mundane that is needed, not the profound. 99
However, as the scientific evidence discussed above demonstrates,2oo creativity does not usually represent a startling break-through
of new thoughts as, more often, it results from the reworking of preexisting ideas and facts as part of a new strange attractor within the author's brain. Even where a revolutionary conception is made, the brain
process behind it lacks any "spark" unless the spark results from a misfiring of the brain. The lower courts' expectations of intellectual brilliance
to justify a copyright are consequently unrealistic and damaging and do
not implement Feist'sjurisprudence. To get the courts out of their troubled waters, an analytical approach that restores intellectual creativity to
its proper place is needed.
V. PUTTING CREATIVITY IN ITS PLACE-A REALISTIC ANALYTIC
TECHNIQUE TO IDENTIFY THE PRESENCE OF INTELLECTUAL CREATIVITY

To determine if the minimal intellectual creativity required is present, an analytical approach is needed that will avoid people's natural
inclination to judge the appeal of the creativity rather than its mere presence.20 1 It is much easier, after all, to declare a Monet painting creative
than someone else's toddler's scrawl, but, from a copyright perspective,
both are creative and both should be eligible for protection. °2 To avoid
denying an unappealing work its copyright, a more rigorous analysis is
needed. Fortunately, one does not need to be invented from whole cloth;
instead, Computer Associates International,Inc. v. Altai, Inc.20 3 provides

a good framework for constructing an intellectual creativity analysis.
Computer Associates instructs that a three-part "abstractionfiltration-comparison" test should be used to determine if one computer
program infringes another. 204 This test was created by the Second Circuit
to remove the "metaphysical distinctions" that were distracting courts in
199.

See Feist,499 U.S. at 345.

200. See supra Part 111
201.
Cf Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (recognizing
judges cannot be trusted to be the arbiters of the worth of visual images).
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "); Cf Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[T]he courts have not undertaken to assume the
functions of critics, or to measure carefully the degree of originality, or literary skill or training
involved." (quotation marks omitted)).

203.
See generally 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (concerning the scope of a copyright in a
computer program), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998).
204.
ComputerAssociates, 982 F.2d at 706. The "abstraction" step in the Computer Associates
test requires that the court "dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and isolate each level of

abstraction contained within it." Id. at 707. The "filtration" procedure is used to screen from the
abstractions anything that is not protectable by copyright such as ideas, items from the public do-

main, etc. Id. at 707-10. Finally, "comparison" is used to match the surviving items against similar
expressions in the original computer program to determine if there was infringement. Id. at 710-11.
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evaluating whether two computer programs were copies of one another,
and focused the analytical attention on the "practical considerations" that
should drive the decision making. 20 5 As the same problem of focusing on
practical considerations exists in the evaluation of creativity, a new
three-part test based on the structure of the one established in Computer
"abstraction-confirmationbeneficial-the
proves
Associates
examination" test. 206 Although derived from the Computer Associates
test, each of the elements in this new test differs from the original in order to implement the different purpose of the test. 207 The operation of
each component part of the test will be discussed in turn.
A.

Abstraction: Findingthe "Expressive Constituents" within the Work

The ultimate test of intellectual creativity for copyright is whether
the author has expressed a work with the necessary minimum ingenuity
such that it qualifies for a copyright. 20 8 Consequently, the first step in the
analysis is determining what the author has expressed. In other words,
what are the "expressive constituents" contained within the work. Determining what qualifies as an expressive constituent has never been
easy. It requires the court to distinguish between the expression itself and
what is being expressed in the work.209 As Judge Learned Hand stated in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. 2 10 when attempting to make this distinction:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.
The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the [work] is about, and at times might consist only of its title;
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use
which, apart from their expression, his property is
of his "ideas," to
2 11
never extended.

Of course, when doing the analysis for the determination of creativity, the Nichols approach would be used with the opposite purpose. Specifically, it is not important to identify and exclude ideas; instead, the
goal is to identify expressions that do qualify for copyright. The Nichols
205.

Id. at 706.

206.
Although the proposed test is more important in the evaluation of whether there is sufficient intellectual creativity underlying the work in question, the test also is sufficiently powerful to
confirm the presence of origin creativity.

207. As will become clear in the subsequent discussion, it is very important that the courts
distinguish between establishing if creativity is present from whether infringement occurred. See
infra Section V.C.
208. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
209. This is commonly known as the "idea-expression dichotomy." See Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977).
210. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
211. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
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test is not a one-way street, however. As soon as the series of abstractions under Nichols become general enough that they must be considered
as ideas, all that was identified earlier will be the expressive constituents
being sought. The purpose of Nichols, after all, is to find the dividing line
between ideas and expressions so, once it is found, the identified material
on either side of the line can be used.
As occurs when examining infringement, the quantity of expressive
constituents that can be found in different types of works will differ.
Generalizations can be made, however, based on the type of work involved.
If one is dealing with a work of literary fiction, a novel, for example, the expressive constituents include the specific language used, 212 the
overall treatment of the subject including the details emphasized,
the
uniquely defined characters,214 and at least some level of the details of
the plot.21 5 As many of the elements contained within a work of fiction
are fanciful, finding numerous expressive constituents normally is not a
216
problem.
For non-fiction works, the expressive constituents are more limited
than for a work of fiction as any facts contained within the work are outside the ambit of copyright. 17 For these works, the expressive constituents will be found in how the facts are described, not in the facts them218
selves.
Visual works can prove more challenging in attempts to derive the
expressive constituents.2 19 Part of the difficulty with visual works is that
they, as a class, tend to be more abstract than a written work, putting
them closer to the idea end of the idea-expression dichotomy. As impor212. See CRA Mktg., Inc. v. Brandow's Fairway Chrysler-Plymouth-Jeep-Eagle, Inc., No.
Civ.A.98-CV-6485, 1999 WL 562755, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1999) (marketing materials); log,
Inc. v. Bell Logic, LLC, 181 F. Supp. 2d 3 at *6 (D. Mass. 2002) (computer programs).
213.
See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
214. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cit. 1983) (holding a copyright
protects Superman character).
215.
See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. Of course, if the work of fiction makes reference to facts in
establishing its setting, the scene afaire doctrine prevents treating items that are necessary to create
the scene from being considered an expressive element, see Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1403-04 (N.D. Cal. 1995), dismissed by agreement, 57 F.3d
1083 (Fed. Cir. 1995), although how the setting is described may very well be an expressive element
even though the scene itself is not.
216.
Cf Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (recognizing that works of fiction gain a broader copyright protection than non-fiction works). The author has
been unable to find any reported cases where the court determines that a work of fiction is insufficiently creative to obtain a copyright. As of today, none of the works that were generated by an
autonomously creative computer program have been involved in a litigation so the validity of the
claimed copyright has not been tested.
217.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
218.
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57.
219. See Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992(WHP), 2002 WL 485730, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2002).
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tantly, lawyers, judges, and the other participants in the judicial system
do not tend to be trained in the visual arts 2 2 0 rendering them less able to
understand the subtleties of visual languages. 221 Despite this, visual
works are capable of various levels of abstraction, from examining the
work as a whole, by scrutinizing individual picture elements, and even
through the expressive contribution made by the selection and use of the
media in which the work is done, 222 allowing the courts to derive the
various expressive constituents contained within the visual work.
Factual compilations have understandably been the focal point of
intellectual creativity litigation. As the facts themselves are not expressive, 223 the court must determine if the facts are articulated in a way that
makes them an expressive constituent, 2 4 are selected by the author from
a larger superset of possibilities,225 or are arranged by the author in a
226
sufficiently ingenious way. 6 In each of these cases, however, the ex-

pressive element is limited to articulation, selection, or arrangement, the
facts alone are still not expressive constituents.

227

At the end of the first part of the tripartite test, therefore, the expressive constituents contained within the work will have been identified.
Obviously, if no expressive constituents are identified, the work has insufficient intellectual creativity for a copyright to subsist. However, if as
220. The Law School Admission Council maintains statistics of the undergraduate majors of all
individuals who use its service as they apply for admission to law school. Over the last five admission cycles (1997-1998 to 2001-2002), a total of 2,069 applicants listed their first majors as being in
the visual arts (Art/Design, Art History, Fine Art, or Visual Arts/Graphics). See Letter from Robert
Carr, Senior Statistician, Law School Admission Council, to the Author 3 (July 15, 2003) (on file
with author). For the same periods, a total of 388,744 applicants participated in the Service. See id. at
5. Consequently, for the last five admission cycles, only 0.53% of applicants to law school have
undergraduate degrees in the visual arts. Although this number does represent a maximum as some
candidates for admission will participate in more than one admission cycle, the numbers on an
annual basis are consistent: from 0.50% in 1997-1998; through 0.49%, 0.55%, and 0.52%; to 0.59%
in 2001-2002. Id. at 3, 5.
221.

See H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 9-10 (2d ed. 1977).

222. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1167-68 (noting that the complexity of artist's expression of nude will affect the scope of the copyright in the resulting statue as
the court affirmed that the defendant's McDonaldlandcommercials infringed on plaintiff's H.R.
Pufnstuf TV show). While the method of expression can constitute an expressive constituent when
combined with an analysis of the overall expression contained in the work, the method, standing
alone, generally should not be an expressive constituent in its own right. See Stillman v. Leo Burnett
Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (N.D. 111.1989) ("In the same vein, when the similarity between two
works arises exclusively from the use of the same process or technique-for example, the similar
'concept and feel' of two impressionist paintings-it cannot form the basis for a copyright claim.").
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
224. See Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. App. 68, 71, 2002 WL 31007386 at *3 (2d
Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (reasoning written description of tree species may qualify for copyright protection); Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804,
810 (D. Md. 1995) (finding "marketing puffery" contained in database is copyrightable), aff'd 91
F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996) (table).
225. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding database resulting
from the selection of the "best" baseball cards was copyrightable).
226. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing creativity in
placement of the alphabet on a quilt).
227. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45.
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little as one expressive element was found, the next step, confirmation,
must be performed.
B. Confirmation: Insuring that Some of the Expressive Constituents
Originatedfrom a Human
Confirmation is the simplest of the three steps as its purpose is primarily to determine if origin creativity is present. Although simple, it is
nevertheless critical to exclude a pretender, whether the work was copied
from another human's work or from an artificially intelligent computer
program's work. If, for example, the author simply copied another's expression, the confirmation fails, and the work is not creative. 228 What is
critical for this analysis is that another's work was reproduced,22 9 as basing a work on something existing in the world, a mountain, for example,
does nothing to diminish contained creativity.23 °
Just as copying another human's work prevents creativity, so too
does claiming credit for a work generated by an autonomously creative,
artificially intelligent computer program. 231 If a computer is responsible
for the generation of the work, a human cannot claim a copyright in the
work as origin creativity is nonexistent. 232 In applying this standard,
however, it is important that the nature of the computer. program be considered carefully. Many works today are created using computer technology as a tool to assist the author in expressing his or her ideas.233 For
example, a computer word processor is being used to ease the process of
writing this paper. Some of the techniques provided by the program are
merely mechanized versions of the scissors and stapler formerly used to
cut and paste text. Other techniques are more complex, as when a computerized thesaurus is used, making a choice of words available that
might not have otherwise been considered, or the Web is used to perform
instantaneous research. These types of computer techniques do not affect
the presence of creativity, however, as the technology is being used as an
adjunct to a human author.234 The computer eases the author's job, even

228. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In the
copyright context, originality means the work was independently created by its author, and not
copied from someone else's work."); NBC v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524, 532 (D. Conn. 1985)
("Independent creation cannot be actual copying.").
229. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(disallowing copyright to photographic reproductions of existing works that "duplicate exactly" the
originals).
230. See supra Section W.A.
231.

Clifford, Creative Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1698.

232.

Id.

233.

See,

e.g.,

Jessica

K. Hodgins

& James

F. O'Brien,

Computer Animation, in

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 301 (Anthony Ralston et al eds., 4th ed. 2000); Barry
Flachsbart, et al, Computer-Aided Design/Computer-AidedManufacturing(CAD/CAM) in id. at 268.
234. In many ways, the contribution to the work that is made by the computer can be analogized to the contributions made by a human editor as both are responsible for suggesting words and
other changes that can make the resulting work better. Just as an editor's contributions do not change
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when it "suggests" expressive elements, but control of the process remains with the author.
In contrast, where the computer effectively has replaced the human
author, there is insufficient creativity in a work to substantiate a copyright. In the computer program discussed in the author's Creative Computer Programsarticle, the program, rather than the human operator, was
responsible for generating the expressions.2 35 As the human no longer
controlled the expressive process, the human could not claim the resulting works for copyright.2 To draw the parallel, the computer was no
longer easing the author's job; it was supplanting it.
Once expressive constituents are extracted and their origin has been
confirmed, the final step of the analysis is needed. The examination process will address the ultimate question: are the expressive constituents
intellectually creative?
C. Examination:Did the Author DeliberatelyDecide to Do It That Way?

Once the expressive constituents are identified and confirmed, they
237
must be examined to determine if there is the "modicum of creativity
necessary to support copyrightability. Although the Feist case described
the requisite as the need for a "creative spark," 238 this portrayal of creativity is inaccurate 239 and, worse, destructive to the process of evaluating
actual works. Fortunately, the Court's use of the phrase seems more descriptive than mandatory, allowing a more valid methodology to be used
that will achieve the purpose desired by the Court.
In most ways, Feist's creativity requirement is concerned with
choice.24° The Court seems to require two things in order for intellectual
creativity to be found: (1) multiple ways that an expression can be made,
and (2) that the author made a selection from these choices. 241 Accordingly, from these two requisites, a basic test of creativity can be derived:
did the author, having a choice, decide to express the work in the way it
the author's right to his or her copyright, see Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991),
normal uses of computer technology are likewise immaterial.
235.
See Clifford, Creative Computer Program, supra note 5, at 1677, 1703 nn.5, 6. See also

John R. Koza, Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Streeter, Evolving Inventions, Sci. AM., Feb. 2003, at
52 (describing a computer program that can invent).
236. See Clifford, Creative Computer Program,supra note 5, at 1698.
237. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
238.
Id. at 345.
239. See supra Section m11.
240. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place
them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original
that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws.

It.
241.

See id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

was done? In other words, did the author "make a judgment ... determine a preference; [or] come to a conclusion ' 242 about the expression
used?
Only minimal creativity is needed under this test; 243 indeed, even a
single word can demonstrate creativity. When Tennessee Williams
named one of his characters in A Streetcar Named Desire "Stella,' '244 he
was making a creative choice 245 that, standing alone, should be considered sufficiently creative to justify protecting the play with a copyright.
Intellectual creativity is binary - either it is there or it is not. Once it is
determined to be there, the work is creative and can be protected by
copyright. This does not mean, of course, that only copying the name
"Stella" would be sufficient to establish that copyright infringement had
occurred, as copying the name alone would most certainly be considered
de minimus and non-infringing. 246 In other words, the presence of intellectual creativity is a threshold that must be crossed for a work to be protectable, but once the copyright doorway is entered, a new analysis is
needed concerning the quantity and quality of the infringing conduct to
determine if any of the section 106 rights 247 were violated.
D. Applying the Abstraction-Confirmation-ExaminationTest
To be valid, the abstraction-confirmation-examination test must
achieve the proper result when applied to known cases. A succinct examination of four cases, all of which were presented above, will establish
this: Satava v. Lowry, 248 Stuart Entertainment, Inc. v. American Games,
Inc.,249 Torah Soft, Ltd. v. Drosnin 250 and, finally, Feist.25I
When the abstraction-confirmation-examination test is applied to
the facts in Satava,25 2 the court's conclusion of noncopyrightability is
shown to be incorrect. The expressive constituents are numerous, including the orientation of the jellyfish, the specific colors chosen, the positioning of the tendrils, the shape of the body, the overall shape of the
sculpture, as well as the interplay among these elements and the glass
242.
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 517 (2d ed. 1993).
243.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (recognizing work must "possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity ....
for copyrightability) (emphasis added).
244. TENNESSEE WLLIAMs, A STREETCAR NAMED DEsIRE 12 (New Am. Library ed. 1947).

245.
He could have chosen any woman's name as the character is fanciful - not based on a real
character.
246.

See Domsalla v. Stephens, No. CIV.A.300CV2763, 2001 WL 493157, at *1 (N.D. Tex.

May 4, 2001) ("In general, short phrases ... do not exhibit the minimal creativity required for copyright protection.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
247. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
248. 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 983 (2003).
249. No. 1-96-CV-90036 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), aff'd 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1999)
(table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831).
250.
136 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
251.
499 U.S. 340(1991).
252. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 805.
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medium chosen for the artist's expression.25 3 The defendant admitted that
all of these were created by the plaintiff, 25 4 satisfying confirmation. Finally, the choices made by the artist are clear; for example, he could have
moved each tendril into a slightly different position or chosen a different
color in which to depict the jellyfish. Consequently, the examination test
is satisfied, concluding the three-part analysis. As each part of the test
was satisfied, there is sufficient creativity to substantiate the copyright.
The Stuart Entertainment case likewise satisfies the test. 255 Each
bingo card and the sequence of cards found in one of the plaintiffs series
were expressive constituents. 56 Although Stuart did not create the series
of cards itself, it succeeded in interest to the party who did,257 thus satisfying confirmation. Finally, although not as clear as was the case in Satava, choices were exercised in the creation of the bingo cards. The
plaintiff would not accept all bingo cards, as some were considered to be
unplayable, while others were rejected because they did not satisfy the
conditions established for the sequence of cards. 258 As a consequence, the
cards were sufficiently creative and the court's opposite holding was
fallacious.
The analysis in Torah Soft is a much closer call.259 The three possible expressive constituents are the final letter transformations, the choice
of which version of the Prophets and Writings to use, and the Sheimot
changes. 260 All three of these elements pass the confirmation test, 26 1 but
one fails the examination criterion outright, while the other two do not
satisfy it unequivocally.
The final letter transformations clearly fail the final examination requirement as there was, as a practical matter, no choice. If a letter was to
be substituted for a final nun, for example, no other letter could be used
except a regular nun without altering the language in the Bible and, thus,
defeating the program's ability to generate accurate Bible codes. The
version selection for Prophets and Writings only weakly complies with
the test because all of the choices that could be made were from among a
fairly limited universe of possible choices, potentially insufficient to substantiate that the plaintiff made any type of intellectual decision. The
sheimot changes also reside on the borderline of acceptable expressive
constituents under the examination test. The particular typographical
253. See id at 807-08.
254. See id. at 807.
255. Stuart Entm't, slip op. at 1.
256. See id., slip op. at 3. See also Superchips, Inc. v. Street & Performance Elecs., Inc., No.
6:OOCV896ORL31KRS, 2001 WL 697948, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2001) (engine performance
numbers placed in a table are copyrightable).
257.
258.

See Stuart Entre't,slip op. at 3-4.
See id., slip op. at 2-3.

259.
260.
261.

Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
See id. at 286.
See id. at 281.
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symbols chosen to substitute for the Hebrew characters were arbitrarily
selected from a very large universe of possibilities,26 2 demonstrating at
least a minimal amount of decision-making by the author. Strongly mitigating against finding the sheimot changes to be creative, however, is the
inherent meaninglessness of the choices made. Did the author select specific typographical symbols, or did he substitute them without thought?
If the latter is true, the examination test directs that the sheimot changes
263
be found lacking.
Finally, applying the test to Feist confirms the test's compliance
with the intellectual creativity rules established by the Supreme Court. 26
The abstraction stage leads to the identification of only two ossible expressive constituents: the selection of the names to appear26 and the order in which the phone listings were placed in the directory. 2 66 Although

these expressive elements survive the confirmation test, the phone company's agents produced the directory,

267

they fail the examination test.

The selection of names was not the company's subjective choice as the
law required the company to include all of its subscribers.268 As a practical matter, the company had no choice about the order in which the listings were given because, to be functional, the listings had to be placed in
alphabetical order by subscriber's name.2 69 Thus, the abstractionconfirmation-examination test fails and the directory is not sufficiently
creative to be copyrighted.
CONCLUSION

Evaluating expressive works to insure that there is sufficient incorporated creativity, both origin and intellectual, requires careful
consideration of the expressions contained within a work. If the
evaluation is too exacting, the incentives to produce ordinary, run-of-themill works will disappear. On the other hand, if the evaluation is too
lenient, a purported author will be able to monopolize expressions that
were not generated by that author, leaving the public domain depleted as
a result.
262.
Even if the choice was limited to those typographical characters available on a standard
computer keyboard, there were twenty-five choices, "-!@#$%^&*0-++l ][{/,>. In a modern

word processor, many hundreds of additional choices exist. See, e.g., WordPerfect (9th ed. 2000)
(listing 101 "Typographic," 254 "Iconic," and 237 "Math/Science" special characters).
263. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
264.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.

265. See id. at 362.
266. See id. at 361-62.
267. See id at 342.
268. See id. at 363. Compare id. with Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863 (finding that database resulting
from the selection of the "best" baseball cards was copyrightable).
269.

See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. Compare id. (noting the author had no choice but to alphabet-

ize its directory) with Boisson, 273 F.3d at 262 (finding that author had sufficient choices in the
layout of the alphabet on a quilt for it to be considered creative).
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To avoid misconstruing creativity requirements in either direction,
the courts should adopt a method of analysis such as the proposed abstraction-confirmation-examination test that focuses attention on how the
work was generated and avoids cloaking creativity with any romantic or
mystical aspects, as these are not substantiated by the scientific evidence
on the sources of human creativity. Not only will this type of dissection
ensure that the courts implement the jurisprudence of Feist, but it will
also alleviate any concerns, as expressed in Bleistein, that evaluations of
intellectual creativity will transmogrify into exercises of judicial censorship.270 Without a test that concentrates attention on the essence of Feist
and the nature of human inventiveness-choice making by a human author-too many works that are incomprehensible or unappreciated by the
court will be denied copyright protection.

270.

See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.

